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I Introduction 
‘A person who has not made peace with his losses is likely to accept gambles that would be 
unacceptable to him otherwise.’ 
Daniel Kahneman/Amos Tversky (Choices, Values and Frames) 
 
Behavioral economics is the science combining the evident unity of economics and psy-
chology (Camerer et al., 2011). It increases the fit of (behavioral) economic theories to 
human decisions in the economic context. While the major theories and findings of behav-
ioral economics were established in the last decades (Sent, 2004), psychological factors 
were already considered by economists during the classical period. Adam Smith (1759) 
raised psychological principles of individual behavior affecting human decisions in his 
book The Theory of Moral Sentiments. For example, he described the phenomenon subse-
quently named loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) in his book as follows: 
‘we suffer more…when we fall from a better to a worse situation, than we ever enjoy when 
we rise from a worse to a better’ 
Building on these insights, the following generations of researchers, like Herbert Simon 
(Augier and March, 2004), who was awarded the Noble Prize, and George Katona (Hos-
seini, 2011), established a new economic mindset. They discovered a new approach to 
economic thinking that went beyond the borders of neoclassical theories. Combing psy-
chology and economic analysis provided theoretical insights and improved policy recom-
mendations from economics. Thus, behavioral economics is an evolutionary step in eco-
nomics that enhanced the neoclassical approach by considering human behavior (Camerer 
et al., 2011). 
In this thesis, I go into more detail on two specific aspects of behavioral economics, name-
ly the disposition effect and immoral behavior. These topics reflect on popular theoretical 
approaches from behavioral economics, such as Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979) and inequality aversion (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). The disposition effect is a trading 
pattern characterized by investors that are reluctant to sell capital losses and realize capital 
gains early (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). The phenomenon is empirically well-documented 
for investors and substantially reduces their profits from trading (Odean, 1998). Likewise, 
unethical behavior is harmful for the economy. Recent controversial cases of large-scale 
dishonesty associated with high economic losses are the Volkswagen emission control de-
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feat device (Wang et al., 2016) and the Libor manipulation (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012). In 
the following parts of the introduction, I motivate the specific facets of these topics dis-
cussed in the five papers included in the thesis. 
 
In the first part of the thesis, I focus on the disposition effect. The disposition effect in the 
finance sector has been examined for private investors (Odean, 1998; Frazzini, 2006), stu-
dents (e.g., Weber and Camerer, 1998; Chui, 2001), professional traders (Shapira and Ve-
nezia, 2001; Garvey and Murphey, 2004; Fu and Wedge, 2011), and team investors (Rau, 
2015). Indeed, the disposition effect is not only widespread, it is also detrimental for inves-
tors (Odean, 1998). Due to the economic harm of this behavior, it is worthwhile to investi-
gate the disposition effect in general. In this thesis, I approach the disposition effect in 
three studies: i) The effect of deciding on behalf of others on disposition effect behavior 
(chapter II). ii) The effect of prenatal androgen exposure on loss aversion, which is a key 
determinant of the disposition effect (chapter III) and iii) the disposition effect in commod-
ity selling (chapter IV).  
In the paper ‘The disposition effect when deciding on behalf of others’ (Chapter II), our 
special interest was whether prosocial investors exhibit a more pronounced disposition 
effect under investment conditions when they feel closer to the other person. Empirical 
evidence suggests that professional traders who trade on behalf of others are less suscepti-
ble to the disposition effect (Shapira and Venezia, 2001). However, there is a lack of 
knowledge regarding the underlying forces. The effects are also unclear when private in-
vestors are involved. A possible explanation based on the results of Shapira and Venezia 
(2001) is that the trading experience of professional traders leads to improved trading per-
formance (Da Costa Jr. et al., 2013). However, a couple of behavioral effects matter, such 
as, for instance, the perceived degree of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), 
emotional responses (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Summers and Duxbury, 2012) and repu-
tational effects (Heimer, 2016; Pelster and Hofmann, 2017). Another factor is an investor’s 
perceived social concern for her client. There is evidence that social distance to the deci-
sion target is an important determinant for investment behavior when deciding on behalf of 
others (Motinari and Rancan, 2013) and can be detrimental in social trading (Hershfield 
and Kramer, 2017). This emphasizes the role the disposition effect could play when private 
investors trade the money of others. A related case was experimentally demonstrated by 
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Rau (2015), who found that the responsibility for trading in teams increases the occurrence 
of the disposition effect.  
Our study experimentally builds on the idea that social concerns for others are detrimental 
for investors’ performance in social trading. We studied the impact of subjects’ social val-
ue orientation (prosocial vs. individualistic type) on the emergence of the disposition effect 
when deciding for others. We explored this research question experimentally, as this ena-
bled us to tackle possible obstacles which are hard to isolate in the field. First, the setup 
allowed us to focus on the pure effects of intrinsic motivation from the investors’ side. 
That is, the experimental framework of a Responsibility treatment avoided, by design, that 
investors’ extrinsic motives could be a reason for behavioral changes in social trading. 
More precisely, as investors in the Responsibility treatment were not paid based on their 
trading performance, the possibility that they were striving for a (high) personal monetary 
benefit could be ruled out. Moreover, we exogenously matched the decision targets to the 
investors. Thus, extrinsic motives to attract traders were also ruled out. The latter can play 
an important role in online social trading platforms where ‘leading’ traders receive bonuses 
for each trader who decides to copy their trades (Pelster and Hofmann, 2017).  
In chapter III entitled ‘Determinants of financial loss aversion: The influence of prena-
tal androgen exposure (2D:4D)’, I focus on loss aversion. Loss aversion is allegedly one 
of the key drivers for behavioral biases in the financial economics context, e.g., the dispo-
sition effect. However, while loss aversion is important, little research has investigated its 
determinants. In the context of risk aversion and altruism, several determinants related to 
human development have been identified (Garbarino et al.; 2011; Buser, 2012). Therefore, 
it is possible that factors related to human development could also influence the magnitude 
of loss aversion. In particular, biological factors, such as prenatal testosterone exposure, 
are proven to influence (economic) behavior. Prenatal androgens affect the development of 
the brain and increase its future sensitivity to the activational effects of circulating testos-
terone (Breedlove and Hampson, 2002). The most suitable marker to measure fetal andro-
gens is the second-to-fourth digit length ratio (2D:4D), with a relatively longer fourth fin-
ger (lower 2D:4D) indicating higher exposure (Manning et al., 1998). 
With regard to economic preferences, Buser (2012) revealed significant effects of the digit 
ratios (2D:4D) on the monetary amounts given in ultimatum, dictator, trust and public 
good games. Garbarino et al. (2011) and Coates et al. (2009) found that risk-taking in-
creases with a smaller 2D:4D for both females and males. Furthermore, trading success 
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(Coates et al., 2009), choice of occupation (Nye and Orel, 2015) and wages (Nye et al., 
2017), as parameters describing economic behavior, are related to the digit ratio. However, 
the relationship between the 2D:4D digit ratio and loss aversion had not been investigated 
previously. In this context, the research objective was to examine whether prenatal testos-
terone exposure influences the degree of loss aversion, while also taking into account per-
sonal characteristics which potentially influence loss aversion. To answer this research 
question, we conducted a laboratory experiment and surveyed digit ratios. In the experi-
ment, loss aversion was elicited using an incentivized task. 
The relevance of the disposition effect to the finance sector has been thoroughly examined. 
However, the disposition effect also appears in other contexts. In chapter IV, entitled ‘The 
disposition effect in farmers’ selling behavior – An experimental investigation’, we 
conducted an incentivized online experiment with farmers from Germany to investigate 
selling behavior for commodities. There have been several experiments in which the dispo-
sition effect was analyzed for student samples. For example, Weber and Camerer (1998) 
conducted an experiment in which the shares of risky assets could be traded. They found 
that students showed a tendency to sell assets that gained in value and keep assets that had 
dropped in value. In the context of financial and housing markets, Weber and Welfens 
(2006) revealed that learning and greater trading experience lead to a mitigated disposition 
effect. Further experimental investigations of the disposition effect with student samples 
were carried out by Da Costa et al. (2008), Fischbacher et al. (2014), Rau (2014) and Rau 
(2015). However, results based on experiments with students cannot be easily applied to 
other groups of participants in general (Belot et al., 2015), entrepreneurs (Barr and Hitt, 
1986; Haigh and List, 2005), or farmers (Maart-Noelck and Musshoff, 2014; Hermann and 
Musshoff, 2016).  
In this context, our objective was twofold: i) to investigate the presence of a disposition 
effect in the decisions of farmers selling stored commodities and ii) the analysis of factors 
potentially influencing the disposition effect. Thus, we provided three contributions to the 
existing literature. First, we experimentally analyzed whether farmers reveal a disposition 
effect in their decision to sell stored commodities. While empirical studies – mainly based 
on aggregated price data – have revealed evidence of a disposition effect in the selling be-
havior of farmers, only an experimental setting allows the underlying beliefs regarding 
price developments to be controlled. Second, we adjusted the well-proven experimental 
setting of Weber and Camerer (1998) from the context of financial economics to agricul-
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tural economics. This experimental design had not yet been applied in the agricultural con-
text. Third, we investigated factors that potentially influence the disposition effect, espe-
cially Prospect Theory components and socio-economic variables. 
 
In the second part of the thesis, I focus on immoral behavior. Immoral actions are com-
monplace and their consequences affect everyone in the private, business and public sector. 
As mentioned, very topical demonstrations of large-scale dishonesty are the Volkswagen 
emission control defeat device (Wang et al., 2016) and the Libor manipulation (Abrantes-
Metz et al., 2012). Volkswagen was dishonest regarding their emission values and thereby 
have harmed their customers and the public due to decreasing residual values of purchased 
cars and decreased air quality (Wang et al., 2016). The Libor manipulation, on the other 
hand, was a dishonest report of interest rates by large banks. These reports led to manipu-
lated reference interest rates and damage to the global economy running into the millions 
of euros (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012). Likewise, the so-called Panama papers revealed the 
great extent and serious nature of tax evasion and tax avoidance, which harm the public 
sector by reducing national budgets (Chohan, 2016). Besides these examples of lying, 
stealing also harms the economy. Worldwide, there is about $48 billion of retail loss annu-
ally due to employee theft and about $48 billion from shoplifting (The Smart Cube, 2015). 
Due to the substantial consequences of immoral action for the economy, it is worthwhile 
for economists to deal with this topic. With this thesis, I contribute to the literature by: i) 
investigating the influence of social distance on honesty and ii) analyzing differences in the 
moral costs of lying and stealing. 
Honesty depends on both personal and situational factors. The primary focus of chapter V, 
entitled ‘Be close to me and I will be honest: How social distance influences honesty’, 
was on the situational factor of social distance. Specifically, we had participants in a labor-
atory experiment allocate money between themselves and someone else, who was either 
another participant or the experimenter. In this context, the other participant (i.e., a fellow 
student), was socially closer to the participant than the experimenter. The allocation in-
volved honesty because participants received a random ‘suggestion’ based on the outcome 
of a die roll of how to allocate money and they had to lie in order to depart from this sug-
gestion. Technically speaking, our experiment combined a dictator game with Fischbacher 
and Föllmi-Heusi’s (2013) die-rolling task.  
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Social distance – i.e., how close agents are to each other (Akerlof, 1997) – has barely been 
considered as an influential factor regarding honesty. By contrast, several studies have 
documented the effect of social distance on the outcome of social interactions. For in-
stance, Buchan et al. (2006) showed that other-regarding preferences, such as trust, reci-
procity, or altruism, are more pronounced with a lower degree of social distance. Eckel and 
Grossman (1996) found that altruism in dictator games varied with the distance between 
the dictator and the recipient, who was either an anonymous student or a reputable charity. 
Charness and Gneezy (2008) found that dictators are more willing to give to recipients as 
social distance decreases. Similarly, Zultan (2012) reported more cooperation in the ulti-
matum game after pre-game face-to-face communication, which apparently reduces social 
distance. 
Prior research has shed light on contextual factors related to our experiment. In particular, 
there is evidence that face-to-face as opposed to anonymous interaction (Holm and Kawa-
goe, 2010; van Zant and Kray, 2014) and personalized as opposed to standardized messag-
es increase honesty (Cappelen et al., 2013). Participants in experiments have also been 
found to lie more often when they feel they are treated unfairly (Houser et al., 2012), and 
there is even evidence of people engaging in ‘white lies’ to benefit others (Erat and 
Gneezy, 2012) and justifying their dishonesty (Lewis et al., 2012). The effect of social dis-
tance, in turn, had not been directly examined yet. Social distance is arguably an important 
driver of honesty or dishonesty, though, since lying occurs in the context of social interac-
tions. It is therefore interesting to investigate whether dishonesty depends on social dis-
tance and if this effect hinges on personal preferences for honesty and fairness. 
The influence of social distance on honesty is important because it relates to most interac-
tions that involve honesty. For example, public authorities usually appear as a distant and 
impersonal interaction partner to people, and honesty is indeed a major concern in tax col-
lection. In this and other areas, people often interact through intermediaries, who increase 
social distance between the interaction partners. More generally speaking, the wide use of 
the internet has profoundly simplified but also depersonalized communication.  
In chapter VI, entitled ‘I might be a liar, but not a thief: An experimental distinction 
between the moral costs of lying and stealing’, we shed light on the different moral costs 
of dishonesty and stealing. Due to the importance of immoral behavior in all of its manifes-
tations in the economic context, several studies have focused on lying as well as stealing in 
different situations (see Rosenbaum et al., 2014). These investigations provide evidence 
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that non-pecuniary moral costs arise from lying and stealing. This enhances the (neo-
)classical theory on immoral behavior as a product of income effects and the probability of 
getting caught and punished (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013; Gneezy, 2005). 
However, there is a lack of knowledge regarding the amount of lying and stealing in an 
experiment with constant incentives and risk of being caught as a consequence of immoral 
behavior. However, the studies of Belot and Schröder (2013) and Gravert (2013) indicate 
that a direct comparison of lying and stealing would be worthwhile. Gravert (2013) found 
that self-reported outcome tasks reduce stealing compared to an effort-based theft task. 
Furthermore, providing the possibility to lie and steal simultaneously (Belot and Schröder, 
2013) leads to the avoidance of stealing by participants. The differentiation of the costs 
associated with these two immoral behaviors has relevant implications for social interac-
tions and economic questions. If one of these immoral behaviors is associated with higher 
intrinsic costs for economic agents, it might be possible to reduce economic losses by re-
framing decisions in the respective context. For instance, the transfer of responsibility to 
agents under conditions of asymmetric information and consequently the changed percep-
tion of the immoral action might increase behavior which is in accordance with moral con-
victions.  
Our study contributes to the literature by investigating whether the intrinsic costs of lying 
and stealing differ. To achieve this, we implemented an experimental design in which par-
ticipants in a lying treatment rolled a die on their computer screen and reported the out-
come. In contrast, participants in a stealing treatment did not report the outcome, but rather 
allocated the money in private - i.e., it was possible to steal. Participants received an enve-
lope containing the maximum possible payoff and were asked to take the money according 
to the die-rolling outcome. Based on the identical framework conditions and incentives, we 
were able to distinguish between moral costs of lying and stealing. 
Since behavioral economics is a rather new area of economic research, several interesting 
and worthwhile research questions remain unanswered. All chapters in this thesis contrib-
ute to the existing knowledge in this field by filling research gaps in various areas of inter-
est. The studies composing this thesis also brought to light further undiscovered topics for 
future research in this interesting field of economics. 
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Abstract 
This article presents experimental evidence on the disposition effect in a situation where an 
investor decides on behalf of another person. In our setting, trading effort should only be 
affected by investors’ intrinsic motivation, as trading actions only influence the profits of a 
matched person. In a control treatment, trades directly influence investors’ profits. We find 
that trading on behalf of others increases disposition effects. The effect is caused by inex-
perienced investors, characterized by a greater concern for others. Thus, trading responsi-
bility results in an emotional burden for investors, which leads to weak trading perfor-
mance. 
Keywords: Disposition effect, experiment, decisions on behalf of others, social value ori-
entation, loss aversion.  
JEL Codes: C91, D14, D81, G41 
 
1. Introduction 
The disposition effect is a trading pattern characterized by investors that are reluctant to 
sell capital losses and realize capital gains early (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). The phe-
nomenon is empirically well-documented for private investors (Odean, 1998; Frazzini, 
2006), students (e.g., Weber and Camerer, 1998; Chui, 2001), professional traders (Shapira 
and Venezia, 2001; Garvey and Murphey, 2004; Fu and Wedge, 2011), and team investors 
(Rau, 2015). Indeed, the disposition effect is not only widespread it is also detrimental for 
investors (Odean, 1998).  
Due to this importance a better understanding of the influencing factors of this phenome-
non is crucial. There is evidence that disposition effects occur as a result of a combination 
of reference-dependent behavior (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979; Shefrin and Statman, 
1985) and reference-dependent emotions (Summers and Duxbury, 2012). It follows from 
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) that loss-averse investors might have 
problems with realizing capital losses (Barberis and Xiong, 2012). Genesove and Mayer 
(2001) report empirical evidence that loss aversion positively correlates with disposition 
effects. Summers and Duxbury (2012) reveal that such a behavior is amplified by refer-
ence-dependent emotions. That is, investors keep capital losses to avoid the feeling of re-
gret when realizing that they invested in a disadvantageous stock. By contrast, if stocks 
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exceed the purchase price, risk-averse investors quickly realize them (Shefrin and Statman, 
1985). In this case, Summers and Duxbury (2012) find that rejoicing additionally stimu-
lates the realization of capital gains. Overall, it turns out that disposition effects in particu-
lar occur as a result of self-control problems (Shefrin and Statman, 1985). 
Laboratory experiments are appropriate instruments to test how institutional interventions 
can help to overcome self-control problems. There is evidence that automatic stop-loss 
orders (Weber and Camerer, 1998; Fischbacher et al., 2017) or the salient presentation of 
purchase prices (Frydman and Rangel, 2014) can attenuate the emergence of disposition 
effects. Another form of intervention which might impact disposition effects is ‘trading on 
behalf of others.’ The analysis of social trading is of importance, as private investors fre-
quently delegate their decisions to professional traders (Garvey and Murphy, 2004). There 
is evidence that private investors with a low financial literacy are more likely to rely on 
family and friends (Van Rooij et al., 2011). The increasing popularity of delegated private 
investment choices is demonstrated by the popularity of stock investment clubs or ‘social-
trading networks’ such as ‘etoro’ (see http://www.etoro.com). The etoro platform allows 
investors to copy the trades of other traders, which can be seen as a form of delegated in-
vestment decision-making. 
Empirical evidence suggests that professional traders who trade on behalf of others are less 
susceptible to causing disposition effects (Shapira and Venezia, 2001). However, there is a 
lack of knowledge regarding what the underlying forces are. The effects are also unclear 
when private investors are involved. An explanation for Shapira and Venezia’s (2001) re-
sults might be that the trading experience of professional traders leads to improved trading 
performance (Da Costa Jr. et al., 2013). However, a couple of behavioral effects matter, 
such as, for instance, the perceived degree of loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky, 
1979), emotional responses (Shefrin and Statman, 1985; Summers and Duxbury, 2012) or 
reputational effects (Heimer, 2016; Pelster and Hofmann, 2017). Another factor is an in-
vestor’s perceived social concern for her client. There is evidence that social distance to 
the decision target is an important determinant for investment behavior when deciding on 
behalf of others (Motinari and Rancan, 2013) and can be detrimental in social trading 
(Hershfield and Kramer, 2017). This emphasizes the disposition effects, if private investors 
trade with their friends’ money. A related case is experimentally demonstrated by Rau 
(2015), who finds that responsibility for trading increases the disposition effects in teams.  
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Our study experimentally builds on the idea that social concerns for others are detrimental 
for investors’ performance in social trading. We study the impact of subjects’ social value 
orientation (prosocial type vs. individualistic type) on the emergence of disposition effects 
when deciding for others. Our experiments also control for additional factors which might 
affect disposition effects, such as loss aversion and trade experience. Recent findings of 
Andersson et al. (2014) suggest that deciding for others lowers loss aversion when choos-
ing between lotteries in a price-list design. We test whether a different degree of perceived 
loss aversion in social trading affects disposition effects. Importantly, in our experiment we 
isolate the effects caused by monetary incentives or reputational concerns. Investors are 
matched to an anonymous client and the decision-makers’ payment does not depend on 
their trading performance. Our setup minimizes reputational concerns as decision targets 
do not select the investors and are not informed of their performance before the experiment 
is finished. To analyze the effect of trading on behalf of others, we conduct two treatments 
based on the design of Weber and Camerer (1998). In the main treatment called ‘Responsi-
bility,’ each subject is randomly matched with an anonymous other subject. All participants 
repeatedly take investment decisions on behalf of others and know that their profits depend 
only on the performance of another participant who is also trading on their behalf.
1
 Our 
control treatment (‘Individual’) is an exact replication of Weber and Camerer (1998), i.e., 
investors trade only for their own benefits.  
The results reveal that disposition effects are significantly higher in the Responsibility 
treatment. Furthermore, our findings show that the treatment effect can be entirely ex-
plained by differences in investors’ social value orientation. It turns out that inexperienced 
investors, characterized by a prosocial attitude face self-control problems when taking de-
cisions for others. The data show that this group exhibits a significantly higher disposition 
effect in social trading as compared to the case when trading for own benefits. By contrast, 
no treatment effect can be observed for individualists. The results add interesting new in-
sights into the behavior of private traders who trade on behalf of their friends or are part of 
investment clubs. 
                                                 
1
 To study trading on behalf of others in isolation, we followed Andersson et al. (2014) and refrained from 
situations where a monetary conflict of interest exists between the investor and the stakeholder.  
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2. Hypotheses 
In this section we derive our hypotheses. Experimental evidence of team investment deci-
sions demonstrate that payoff externalities enhance self-control problems, if trading also 
affects the payoff of a matched partner. Rau (2015) shows that teams of two investors are 
reluctant to sell capital losses. Empirical evidence of a social-trading platform suggests that 
reputational effects induce higher disposition effects for traders who are followed by others 
(Pelster and Hofmann, 2017). In our Responsibility treatment, where subjects only trade for 
the benefit of another matched person, we expect that prosocial investors should be affect-
ed by this condition. The reason is that these traders have a low perceived social distance 
to the decision target (Montinari and Rancan, 2013) and therefore should have increased 
problems in regulating their emotions (Hershfield and Kramer, 2017). Hence, we expect 
that disposition effects are more pronounced when traders are responsible for other per-
sons. 
Hypothesis 1: 
(a) Disposition effects are higher in the Responsibility treatment than in the control treat-
ment. 
(b) In Responsibility, disposition effects will be stimulated by investors with a prosocial 
attitude. 
Empirical and experimental evidence reveals that individual loss aversion stimulates dispo-
sition effects (Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Rau, 2014). Thus, we expect that subjects with 
a higher degree of loss aversion realize fewer capital losses and exhibit more pronounced 
disposition effects. Andersson et al. (2014) report that subjects behave less loss-averse 
when deciding for others. In Responsibility, investors trade on behalf of others. As trades 
do not affect their income, they should have a different perception of losses in this case. 
Hence, the correlation between loss aversion and disposition effects should be less pro-
nounced in Responsibility.  
Hypothesis 2:  
(a) Individual loss aversion is positively correlated with disposition effects. 
(b) In Responsibility, the impact of loss aversion on disposition effects is attenuated. 
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3. Experimental design 
In this section we describe our experimental design. First, the experiment design of Weber 
and Camerer (1998) is introduced. Second, we discuss the differences between our treat-
ments Individual and Responsibility. Third, we provide a brief overview of the additional 
experimental tasks implemented to measure individual preferences (risk aversion, loss 
aversion, and social value orientation) and personal characteristics. 
3.1  The framework of Weber and Camerer 
In the experimental framework of Weber and Camerer (1998) six different labeled assets 
A, B, C, D, E, and F can be traded over 14 periods. The asset prices are predetermined for 
all periods and follow a distinct random process. Participants’ trading actions do not influ-
ence stock prices. The price sequences of all 14 periods are pre-determined before the ex-
periment starts. The stocks are classified in different types according to their chances of a 
price increase. More precisely, exactly one stock follows a good/very good quality (la-
beled: +, ++), one stock follows a poor/very poor quality (labeled: −, − −), and two stocks 
fluctuated around the starting price with a 50% probability of rising prices (labeled: 0). 
Subjects were told about the existence of the types and their characteristics, but received 
no information on the allocation of the labels. Our experiment applied the same stocks (A 
to F), the same allocation of the stock types, and the same price sequences as in Weber and 
Camerer (1998). In each period, prices are determined in two stages: 1. determination of 
the direction of price movement; 2. determination of the change in the price magnitude. 
The two stages are explained in detail in the following sections. 
3.1.1  Stage 1: Determination of the Direction of Price Movement  
In the first stage the computer determines whether an asset will increase/decrease in value. 
The probability of a price increase/decrease depends on the assets’ stock types. Weber and 
Camerer’s (1998) random process allocates fixed probabilities of stock price increas-
es/decreases for each type of each quality. This feature allows the predetermination of the 
sequence of the price changes. A random process determines whether a stock will increase 
or decrease in value. This depends on the underlying probabilities of price increases of the 
stock types. Although the participants are familiarized with the probabilities of a price in-
crease or decrease, they do not know which probability belongs to which stock. Neverthe-
less, the participants can guess by counting and comparing the number of price increases in 
the previous periods. Table 1 presents the underlying allocation of the stocks (A to F) to 
the types. Our experiment follows Weber and Camerer (1998) and adopts their design.  
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Table 1: Stock characteristics 
Stock Probability of price change 
Name Type Increase Decrease 
A + 55% 45% 
B – 45% 55% 
C – – 35% 65% 
D; E 0 50% 50% 
F ++ 65% 35% 
Note: Overview of the stock types and their probabilities of price increases and decreases (stock names are 
not shown to the participants).  
3.1.2  Stage 2: Determination of the Price Magnitude  
After the random process determines whether an asset will increase, the computer random-
ly determines the magnitude of the price change in the second stage. It can be either 1, 3 or 
5 Talers. All outcomes occur with a probability of one third. The probability of a stock 
price increase is not correlated with the magnitude of the price change and the expected 
value of a price change for a randomly-chosen stock is zero (Weber and Camerer, 1998).
2
 
Weber and Camerer (1998) determined the price sequences of stocks according to this ap-
proach. They also computed the asset prices for four prior periods: -3, -2, -1, and 0. This 
information is presented to subjects prior to the start of the experiment. The purpose is to 
give participants an initial idea of the stocks’ characteristics. In this experiment we also 
present this information to subjects prior to the start of the experiment. Figure 1 illustrates 
the resulting stock movements of Weber Camerer (1998) in periods -3 to 14. 
                                                 
2
 The framework easily allows the application of Bayesian Updating in each period. Bayesian subjects would 
repeatedly update their beliefs on the increase probability of all six shares, based on the actual observed 
price changes. Hence, investors might apply a simple heuristic of counting the number of times a stock in-
creased to determine its type. The stock whose price has increased most often is most likely to be of the ++ 
type. The stock which had the second highest number of price increases has to be of type +, etc.  
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Figure 1: Price movements of stocks A to F over time. 
Note: Dashed line marks the beginning of the trade period; Figure is not shown to the participants at the be-
ginning of the experiment. 
 
 
3.1.3  Elicitation of Guess Scores  
In the experiment we follow Weber and Camerer (1998) to examine the possibility that 
subjects’ disposition effects are caused by a misjudgment of the stock types. That is, after 
periods 7 and 14 subjects must guess the type of each of the six stocks. The estimates are 
used to derive delta (δ), a measure of fit between the best fit and a subject’s guess of the 
stock type. The guesses of the six stocks are coded as follows: ++ = 2, + = 1, 0 = 0, − = -1, 
− − = -2. The coding corresponds to the rational estimate. Afterwards, the absolute value of 
the difference between a subject’s guess and the rational estimate is calculated for each of 
the six stocks. The delta corresponds to the sum of the absolute differences of all six 
stocks. The δ measure ranges from 0 (best estimates) to 12 (worst estimates). For instance, 
if a subject guesses that the ++-type is stock ‘F’ then the subject’s actual estimate equals 
the rational estimate. Thus, the difference is: 2−2 = 0. If the subject guesses that the 0-type 
is stock ‘A’ then the difference is: 1−0 = 1. It follows for the delta of this subject: δ = 0 + 
1+ etc.  
3.1.4  Measures of the Disposition Effect 
When investors sell shares, the purchase prices are not always known. Hence, the paper 
reports two accounting principles to compute results: (i) Average Price; (ii) First-In-First-
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Out (FIFO).
3
 The Average-Price approach (e.g., Odean, 1998) determines the purchase 
price as the weighted average of all purchase prices. Whereas, the FIFO measure identifies 
the purchase prices by assuming that investors sell the stocks in distinct orders. That is, it 
assumes that investors first sell the stocks which were bought first.  
Furthermore, the analysis follows Odean (1998) to investigate the occurrence of disposi-
tion effects. Therefore, we determine the proportion of gains realized (PGR) and the pro-
portion of losses realized (PLR). The PGR (PLR) is the number of realized gains (losses) 
divided by the total number of possible gains (losses) that could have been sold. In accord-
ance with Odean (1998), it can be defined as follows: 
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 (𝑃𝐺𝑅) =
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠 + 𝑃𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐺𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑠
 (1) 
   
 
𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑜𝑓 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 (𝑃𝐿𝑅) =
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
𝑅𝑒𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑧𝑒𝑑 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠 + 𝑃𝑎𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝐿𝑜𝑠𝑠𝑒𝑠
 (2) 
 
We calculated the individual-level disposition effects (DE) for all participants as the differ-
ence between the PGR and PLR: 
 𝐷𝐸 = 𝑃𝐺𝑅 − 𝑃𝐿𝑅 (3) 
 
The DE measure is restricted to a range between -1 and 1. Participants with DE = 1 (-1) 
realized all gains (losses) immediately, whereas they never realized losses (gains). For in-
vestors with DE = 0, PGR and PLR are equal.  
We also compute disposition effects with the measure of Weber and Camerer (1998) to 
provide a robustness check for the DE measure. We refer to this measure as the ‘alpha’ 
measure. Alpha examines whether participants used last period’s prices as reference points. 
More precisely, it is tested whether subjects prefer to sell stocks after price increases of the 
last period’s price. The alpha measure is defined as: 
 
𝛼 =
(𝑆+ −  𝑆−)
(𝑆+ + 𝑆−)
 (4) 
𝑆+ ( 𝑆−) represents the sum of sales realized after price increases (decreases). Alpha corre-
sponds to the difference in sales after a price increase and a price decrease, normalized by 
                                                 
3
 We also calculated LIFO (Last-In-First-Out) but results are not affected by using this accounting principle. 
Weber and Camerer (1998) and Rau (2015) also find no differences between these accounting principles. 
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the total number of sales. An alpha of 1 (-1) indicates that participants only sold after the 
price increased (decreased). If the alpha amounts to zero, the number of sells after price 
increases and price decreases is the same. 
3.2  Individual versus Responsibility Treatment 
In a between-subject design, we test for differences between the two treatments: Individual 
and Responsibility. Individual is identical to the experiment of Weber and Camerer (1998) 
as well as Rau (2015). It follows the framework described in section 3.1. A crucial differ-
ence applies to Responsibility, where participants decide on behalf of another participant 
from the respective experimental session. The experiment was programmed using z-Tree 
(Fischbacher, 2007) and carried out in fall 2016. The data encompasses four sessions of 
Responsibility with a total of 85 subjects and four sessions of Individual with a total of 85 
subjects. In total, 170 participants took part in the experiment and were recruited with OR-
SEE (Greiner, 2004). The subject pool consisted of students from a German university 
from various fields who earned €16.70 on average. The majority studied economics, i.e., 
37.6% of the subjects in Individual and 35.5% of the subjects in Responsibility. We explic-
itly excluded participants who heard a lecture about finance. The sessions lasted approxi-
mately 110 minutes. 
3.2.1  Procedures of the Individual treatment 
In Individual all participants received an endowment of 10,000 Talers. In both treatments 
we applied an exchange rate of 1,000 Taler = €1. In periods 1 to 13 (see Figure 1) subjects 
could buy or sell assets which were labeled with the neutral German word ‘Anteile’ 
(‘‘shares”). Subjects did not necessarily have to invest any amount of their endowment. 
There were no transaction costs for trading actions and subjects were not allowed to make 
short sales, i.e., they could only sell stocks which they owned. In period 14 subjects’ port-
folios were automatically liquidated. Their final payoff corresponded to the value of the 
liquidated portfolio plus the money they owned in period 14. To evaluate whether subjects 
had a good understanding of the stock types, they had to guess the stock types after periods 
7 and 14. Here, they received 200 Talers (€0.20) for each correct guess.  
3.2.2  Responsibility 
In Responsibility almost everything was identical to Individual. However, one crucial dif-
ference was that a trader decided on behalf of someone else and her outcome of the trading 
experiment also depended on the decisions of someone else. To establish this treatment 
environment, all participants acted in the role of an investor and recipient. More precisely, 
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subjects determined with their trading actions the payoff of a randomly matched recipient. 
At the same time, they received a payoff which depended on the trading performance of 
another randomly matched participant. Our matching procedure ruled out that two subjects 
could mutually generate their payoffs. We explicitly informed our subjects on this match-
ing procedure which prevents participants from evolving any kind of reciprocal mental 
connection to their matched partner. At the beginning of the experiment every participant 
received a note containing a letter from the alphabet attached to the instructions. Partici-
pants made aware that the letter served as their experimental identity.
4
 Afterwards, partici-
pants were told in the instructions that they had to decide for another participant in the ex-
perimental session and that their earnings from the experiment would depend on someone 
else. Most importantly, to rule out any form of potential mental reciprocal relation, we 
stated in the instructions that: ’The participant who decides for you is not the same person 
as the person you are deciding for.’ When the trading experiment started, participants re-
ceived a screen message informing them of the letter of the participant which they would 
be deciding for. Moreover, they were shown the letter of the person who would be decid-
ing for them. Our matching procedure worked as follows: for instance, a participant re-
ceived the letter ‘A’, i.e., she knew that her name was ‘A’. Moreover, the participant was 
informed on the computer screen that she would take the trading decisions on behalf of 
participant ‘B’. However ‘A’ received the earnings according to decisions of a third partic-
ipant, namely participant ‘C’. We informed participants in the decision sheet of each peri-
od that they would decide on behalf of the matched recipient. Therefore, we repeatedly 
mentioned that they would be making their decisions on behalf of this participant. 
3.3 Additional experimental tasks  
Besides the main trading experiment, we conducted further elicitation tasks. Before the 
trading experiment started, a computerized risk-aversion, loss-aversion and social value 
orientation elicitation task was conducted. Finally, after the trading experiment had been 
carried out, subjects’ empathy, levels of perceived regret, and rejoice were elicited in a 
post-experimental questionnaire.  
To elicit risk aversion, we carried out a modified version of the measure, introduced by 
Eckel and Grossman (EG; Eckel and Grossman, 2008). In the EG task participants chose a 
preferred lottery from a set of lotteries. The classical form of the EG, however, allows us to 
                                                 
4
 Participants in Individual received a note containing a letter as well, in order to provide comparable frame-
work conditions in both scenarios. 
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measure detailed distinctions exclusively for different levels of risk aversion. We therefore 
decided to extend the classical EG task to gather additional information on whether partic-
ipants were risk-neutral or risk-seeking.
5
 
In a next step we elicited subjects’ loss aversion through an incentivized multiple price list, 
introduced by Gächter et al. (GJH; Gächter et al., 2007) and used in several other studies, 
e.g., Dutcher et al. (2015) and Koudstaal et al. (2016).
6
 Participants had to decide 10 times 
whether they wished to take part in a lottery or not. In all 10 lotteries, participants could 
face a loss with a chance of 50%, or receive a gain with a probability of 50%. The proba-
bilities for a loss or gain as well as the amount of the gain are constant across all lotteries. 
However, the potential loss increases across the lotteries. The GJH task allows for a char-
acterization of participants regarding their degree of loss-aversion, which is expressed by 
lambda (λ), a coefficient indicating loss-aversion (Gächter et al., 2007). The task was in-
centivized and each participant received an endowment of €0.707 at the beginning of the 
experiment. This endowment ensured that no participant had a negative payoff. To deter-
mine each participant’s final payoff, a random lottery was drawn. If the random lottery was 
accepted by the participant, the respective lottery was performed and the outcome was 
added to the initial endowment. If the random lottery was rejected, the participant did not 
take part in the lottery and received the endowment. 
To answer our question of whether investors’ social-value orientation (SVO) impacts dis-
position effects when deciding on behalf of others, we elicited subjects’ SVO with an in-
centivized measure according to Murphy et al. (2011) (see appendix A.3). In the SVO 
Slider Measure, participants had to decide in six different decision situations (‘sliders’) 
which allocation of tokens they would like to choose from a given set of combinations. 
Each combination included an amount of tokens which would be received by the deciding 
participant and an associated amount of tokens which would be received by a randomly 
matched participant.
8
 Every participant received a payment from the SVO Slider Measure. 
Participants were informed that the decision in one of the six sliders would be relevant for 
their payment. In this case, in a random draw half of the participants (‘deciders’) received 
                                                 
5
 For detailed illustration of the conducted task and possible outcomes of the lotteries, please refer to appen-
dix A.1. To determine the payoff, the chosen lottery was performed and the outcome was paid to the partic-
ipant at the end of the experimental session. 
6
 The modified design of the GJH-task is adapted from Rau (2014) and can be found in appendix A.2. 
7
 The monetary amounts used in the tasks were chosen according to an average wage approach: average wage 
per time unit multiplied by the expected time units to carry out the task. 
8
 The randomly assigned participant was not the same as in the stock trading experiment. 
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the monetary amount according to their own decisions and the other half received a mone-
tary amount depending on the decision of the randomly matched ‘decider.’ 
In addition, we measured subjects’ empathy using a 16-item questionnaire answered on a 
5-point Likert scale.
9
 The empathy measure is based on the Interpersonal Reactivity Index 
(IRI), introduced by Davis (1983). We used a modified version according to Paulus (2012). 
To calculate the empathy score of a participant the 5-point Likert scale was transformed 
into numbers. If participants chose the response ‘never’ the corresponding number was 1, 
if they chose ‘rarely’ the number was 2, and so on. The empathy score is the sum of the 16 
items minus the numbers from items 3, 6, 8, and 13. 
4. Results 
In this section, we start with descriptive statistics on trading behavior in our two treat-
ments. Afterwards, we apply non-parametric and parametric-test methods to validate our 
hypotheses. All reported tests are based on two-sided p-values, if not otherwise specified. 
4.1  Trading Behavior 
Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of subjects’ trading behavior in the Individual 
and Responsibility treatment. The third column displays the aggregate data. The table 
presents bought stocks and sold capital gains/losses which denote the average number of 
traded stocks. Whereas the variables processed gains, gain trades, and loss trades focus on 
the average number of processed trades.  
A conspicuous finding is that investors in both treatments sell a significantly higher 
average number of capital gains than capital losses (Wilcoxon matched pairs tests, p < 
0.001; both treatments). A similar pattern can be found when focusing on gain and loss 
trades. This is a first indication that disposition effects obviously occur in both treatments. 
We find that in Responsibility not statistically significant more stocks are bought and more 
capital gains and losses are sold than in Individual. 
                                                 
9
 The translation of the items is provided in appendix A.4. 
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Table 2: Descriptive statistics on trading behavior 
 
Individual 
(n=85) 
Responsibility 
(n=85) 
All data 
(n=170) 
Bought stocks
a)
 141.01 (94.30)  148.88 (80.97)  144.95 (87.72) 
Sold capital gains
b) 
45.74 (50.62) 47.80 (47.31) 45.74 (50.62) 
Sold capital losses
b)
 33.75 (36.34) 35.93 (40.87) 34.84 (38.57) 
Processed trades
c)
 26.79 (12.29) 26.75 (11.75) 26.77 (11.99) 
Gain trades
d)
 4.67 (3.91) 5.13 (3.79) 4.90 (3.85) 
Loss trades
d)
  4.45 (3.77) 4.38 (3.43) 4.41 (3.60) 
Note: Standard deviation in parenthesis. 
a) Number of stocks bought by participants. b) Number of stocks sold as gain (loss) according to the mean 
portfolio value (Odean, 1998). c) Total number of trades (buying and selling) d) Number of trades sold as 
gains (losses) according to the mean portfolio value (Odean, 1998). 
 
4.2  Hypotheses tests 
We turn to our main results. Figure 2 focuses on the disposition effects calculated with the 
method of Odean (1998). The figure depicts subjects’ average Disposition Effects (DE), 
the Proportion of Gains Realized (PGR), and the Proportion of Losses Realized (PLR).  
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Figure 2: Disposition Effects (DE), Proportion of Gains Realized (PGR), and Proportion 
of Losses Realized (PLR) in the treatments Responsibility and Individual. 
The data show that subjects exhibit higher disposition effects when deciding on behalf of 
others (0.02; SD: 0.25) than in the Individual treatment (-0.04; SD: 0.21) (Mann-Whitney 
test, p = 0.067). The finding is also supported by the Alpha measure of Weber and Camerer 
(1998). Figure 3 compares the Cumulative Distribution Functions (CDF) of subjects’ Al-
phas in our two treatments. 
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Figure 3: Alpha measure (Weber and Camerer, 1998) in our treatments. 
The CDFs of subjects’ Alphas are significantly different in the Responsibility treatment 
(0.17) than in the case when subjects trade for their own profits (0.03) (Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test, p = 0.034). Hence, we find support for Hypothesis 1a. 
Result 1: Deciding on behalf of others leads to significantly higher disposition effects as 
compared to trading for own benefits.  
Next, we concentrate on the impact of traders’ social-value orientation (SVO) and test 
whether a lower social distance to the decision target leads to an increase in problems with 
controlling their emotional states (Montinari and Rancan, 2013). Consequently, difficulties 
with self-control might arise (Hershfield and Kramer, 2017) which cause pronounced dis-
position effects (Rau, 2015). We turn to Hypothesis 1b and test whether prosocial traders 
(Prosocials) with a low level of perceived social distance exhibit more pronounced disposi-
tion effects than traders with a high level of perceived social distance (Individualists). Fen-
ton-O’Creevy et al. (2011) point out that investors with low trading experience especially 
have problems in the regulation of emotions. Therefore, we distinguish between the SVO 
of less-experienced traders and more-experienced traders. We classified our participants 
based on their self-reported trading experience
10
 stated on a 10-point Likert scale in our 
post treatment questionnaire. A value of 1 indicate that participants had no or very little 
trading experience and a value of 10 that they perceived themselves as highly experienced 
regarding stock trading (see appendix A.5). Focusing on trading experience, it turns out 
                                                 
10
 We asked subjects: “how high do you estimate your experience in the private trading of stocks? Please 
answer on a scale 1-10 (1 = very low; 10 = very high).”     
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that 54% of our subjects stated that they had very low trading experience of 1. Therefore, 
we classify subjects with a trading experience of 1 (>1) as inexperienced (experienced).  
Focusing on experienced traders, we do not find that social-value orientation statistically 
significantly determines the level of disposition effects in Responsibility (Pearson’s corre-
lation coefficient, ρ = -0.223; p = 0.178).11 By contrast, we observe that the level of per-
ceived social distance clearly matters for inexperienced traders. This finding is illustrated 
in Figure 4 which presents scatter plots of the correlation between subjects’ SVO angle and 
the level of exhibited disposition effects. In the scatter plots data of the treatment Respon-
sibility (left panel) and treatment Individual (right panel) is compared.  
 
Figure 4: Scatter plots on the correlation of the SVO angle of inexperienced traders (trad-
ing experience = 1) and disposition effects in Responsibility (left panel) and Individual 
(right panel). 
Note: Dashed line indicates the threshold of the SVO angle which divided individualistic (left) and prosocial 
(right) subjects (Murphy et al., 2011). 
A conspicuous finding is that in Responsibility we find a significant positive correlation 
between subjects with a higher degree of social-value orientation (i.e., a higher SVO angle) 
and the level of exhibited disposition effects. We interpret these subjects in Responsibility 
as investors who perceive a lower level of social distance to the matched recipient. This 
pattern is confirmed by a significant Pearson’s correlation coefficient (ρ = 0.346; p = 
                                                 
11
A similar finding can be observed in Individual (Pearson’s correlation coefficient, ρ = -0.005; p = 0.978). 
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0.019). Hence, inexperienced prosocial subjects exhibit higher disposition effects than in-
experienced individualists (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.038) when trading on behalf of oth-
ers.  
By contrast, in the right panel, it can be seen that this correlation does not exist when inex-
perienced investors trade for their own interests in treatment Individual. That is, the Pear-
son correlation coefficient is not statistically significant (ρ = -0.006; p = 0.970). When in-
vestors trade for their own benefits, the disposition effects of prosocial and individualistic 
subjects do not differ statistically significantly (Mann-Whitney test, p = 0.282). Important-
ly, for individualistic investors we do not find a significant correlation between SVO angle 
and DE, neither in the Responsibility treatment (ρ = -0.223; p = 0.178), nor in the Individu-
al treatment (ρ = -0.005; p = 0.978). Thus, we find support for Hypothesis 1b when focus-
ing on inexperienced traders. Whereas the hypothesis is rejected for subjects who had trad-
ing experience.  
Result 2a: When inexperienced investors are responsible for other people, prosocial types 
exhibit significantly higher disposition effects than individualistic types.  
Result 2b: When inexperienced investors are responsible for other people, the level of in-
vestors’ social-value orientation determines the level of disposition effects. 
Finally, we analyze whether deciding on behalf of others impacts the degree of perceived 
loss aversion which might affect the occurrence of disposition effects. Focusing on the 
aggregate data, we generally find that disposition effects are stimulated by loss aversion. 
That is, we observe a positive correlation between loss aversion and DE (Pearson’s correla-
tion test, ρ = 0.201; p = 0.014). This is in line with Genesove and Mayer (2001) and Rau 
(2014) and confirms Hypothesis 2a.  
To test the effects of trading on behalf of others, we focus on a disaggregate analysis. If we 
focus separately on the Individual treatment, it becomes obvious that the relation between 
loss aversion and the level of the disposition effect also holds (Pearson’s correlation test, ρ 
= 0.201; p = 0.014). By contrast, the relation becomes insignificant in the Responsibility 
treatment (Pearson’s correlation, ρ = 0.172; p = 0.137). Thus, the effect of loss aversion is 
attenuated when subjects decide on behalf of others. This supports the findings of Anders-
son et al. (2014) and is in line with Hypothesis 2b. 
Result 3a: Loss aversion stimulates the occurrence of disposition effects. 
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Result 3b: The relation between loss aversion and disposition effects is attenuated in the 
Responsibility treatment. 
The results show that though deciding on behalf of others attenuates the impact of loss 
aversion on disposition effects, traders do not achieve an improved performance in this 
setting. However, our analysis of the impact of social-value orientation provides an an-
swer: As it turns out, prosocial investors who perceive a lower distance to their matched 
person exhibit particularly high disposition effects.  
4.3 Regression Analyses 
To provide an in-depth analysis of disposition effects, we estimate Tobit regressions with 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors on DE, PGR, PLR, and the Alpha-measure of 
Weber and Camerer (1998) for inexperienced participants. Table 3 illustrates the regres-
sion estimates for the four dependent variables DE (models 1–2), PGR (models 3–4), PLR 
(models 5–6) and Alpha (models 7-8).12 In basic regression models, we include a treatment 
dummy (Responsibility) and subjects’ preference parameters (loss aversion and risk aver-
sion). Models (2), (4), (6) and (8) additionally control for the impact of interactions be-
tween treatment dummies (Responsibility and Individual) and subjects’ social-value orien-
tation (prosocial and individualistic). Furthermore, we control for subjects’ gender, the 
stated emotions (regret/rejoice), the level of empathy, their math grade and whether they 
study economics. 
The models (1) and (7) confirm Result 1 for inexperienced traders, i.e., the general treat-
ment effect: when inexperienced participants decide on behalf of another participant, the 
disposition effect is significantly more pronounced than in the Individual treatment. Re-
sults show that the coefficient of Responsibility is positive and significant for the inexperi-
enced traders, however, not for the experienced traders (see regressions in appendix A.6). 
The highly significant positive coefficient of Loss Aversion demonstrates that disposition 
effects are more pronounced for loss-averse traders. This confirms the result of Rau 
(2014). Models (2) and (8) reveal that loss aversion is still a significant determinant of DE, 
if we control for other variables. We find that the female gender is not a factor that increas-
es DE or Alpha significantly for inexperienced traders.
13
 Turning to emotions, we find a 
                                                 
12
 For similar regression estimates of high experienced traders, refer to appendix A.6 
13
 Focusing on the regressions on the sample of experienced traders, we find that gender indeed matters. 
Females in the experienced sample reveal higher disposition effects according to DE and Alpha. On the 
one hand, this result confirms the results of Genesove and Mayer (2001) and Rau (2014). On the other 
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twofold pattern: feelings of regret seem to stimulate the disposition effect. That is, we find 
that the coefficient of Alpha is positive and highly significant. In other words, traders who 
feel high levels of regret have problems to sell stocks, after a stock-price decrease in the 
last periods (Rau, 2015). Regret has also an almost significant effect on DE (p = 0.112). At 
the same time, pride does not affect the disposition effect for inexperienced traders. By 
contrast, all other control variables do not statistically significantly affect DE and Alpha. 
To better understand the driving forces of the treatment differences in disposition effects, 
we focus on subjects’ selling behavior in more detail. In this respect, we run separate re-
gressions on the Proportion of Gains Realized (PGR) (models 3–4) and on the Proportion 
of Losses Realized (PLR) (models 5–6). It becomes obvious from models (3) and (4) that 
the treatment effect is mainly caused by an increased PGR of inexperienced traders in the 
Responsibility treatment. In the Responsibility treatment we find a higher degree of PGR. 
This is highlighted by Model (3) which focuses on subjects’ PGR as dependent variable. 
Here, we find that the coefficient of Responsibility is positive and significant. Thus, when 
inexperienced traders decide on behalf of another person, they show a more pronounced 
tendency to realize capital gains, compared to the situation where they trade for their own 
benefit. Furthermore, we find moderate effects of loss aversion and regret on the degree of 
PLR (see Model (5)). That is, a higher degree of loss aversion and regret lead to a smaller 
degree of PLR. 
                                                                                                                                                    
hand our results indicate that the gender differences are mainly driven by the fact that males improve their 
trading behavior to a higher extent through trading experiences. 
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    Table 3: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors on DE, PGR, PLR and Alpha for subsample of inexperienced traders
a) 
 DE  PGR  PLR  Alpha 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
Constant -0.144
**
 -0.210  0.053 -0.041  0.210
***
 0.189  -0.474
*
 -1.629
**
 
Responsibility (1=yes) 0.099
** 
-  0.082
** 
-  -0.017
 
-  0.309
* 
- 
Prosocial
b)
(1=yes) 0.020 -  0.035 -  0.012 -  0.039 - 
Individual x Prosocial - baseline  - baseline  - baseline  - baseline 
Individual x Individualistic - 0.006  - 0.007  - 0.006  - 0.109 
Responsibility x Prosocial - 0.120
**
  - 0.123
**
  - -0.004  - 0.509
**
 
Responsibility x Individualistic - 0.056  - 0.041  - -0.010  - 0.249 
Loss aversion (lambda)
c)
 0.042
**
 0.038
*
  0.021 0.020  -0.027
*
 -0.023  0.215
*
 0.229
**
 
Risk aversion (CRRA)
d)
 0.018 0.011  -0.015 -0.016  -0.035
*
 -0.029  0.022 0.019 
Female (1=yes) - 0.013  - -0.003  - -0.012  - -0.156 
Pride
e)
 - -0.013  - -0.003  - 0.013  - -0.021 
Regret
f)
 - 0.019  - 0.003  - -0.019
*
  - 0.085
***
 
Empathy
g)
 - 0.001  - 0.002  - 0.001  - 0.016 
Math grade (1–15)h) - 0.005  - 0.003  - -0.002  - 0.026 
Study economics(1=yes) - 0.014  - -0.006  - -0.023  - -0.129 
            
σi) 0.196 0.189  0.160 0.157  0.148 0.143  0.674 0.615 
Observations 80 80  80 80  80 80  80 80 
Note: Ten participants show inconsistent choices (switching back and forth between accepting and rejecting lotteries) in the GJH task and are therefore omitted for the regres-
sion estimates. However, all results are qualitatively identical if we estimate the models without lambda. Level of significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.10 
a) According to a specific question with possible values ranging from 0 (no experience) and 10 (highly experienced). b) According to an incentivized Murphy task, possible 
values ranging from -16.26° to 61.39°. c) According to an incentivized GJH task, possible values ranging from 0.68 to 5.50. d) According to a modified and incentivized EG 
task, possible values ranging from -1.60 to 1.81. e) According to a specific question with possible values ranging from 0 (not proud at all) and 10 (very proud). f) According 
to a specific question with possible values ranging from 0 (no regret) and 10 (very much regret). g) According to the IRI based Saarbrücker personality questionnaire, possible 
values ranging from 12 to 60. h) Possible values ranging from 0 to 15; 15 is the best grade. i) The sigma (σ) value represents the estimated standard error of the interval re-
gressions. 
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To better understand the driving forces of the treatment differences in disposition effects, 
we focus on subjects’ selling behavior in more detail. In this respect, we run separate re-
gressions on the Proportion of Gains Realized (PGR) (models 3–4) and on the Proportion 
of Losses Realized (PLR) (models 5–6). It becomes obvious from models (3) and (5) that 
the treatment effect is mainly caused by an increased PGR in the Responsibility treatment. 
More precisely, in the Responsibility treatment we find more PGR. This is highlighted by 
Model (3) which focuses on subjects’ PGR as dependent variable. Here, we find that the 
coefficient of Responsibility is positive and significant. Thus, when participants decide on 
behalf of another person, they reveal a more pronounced tendency to realize capital gains, 
compared to the situation where they trade for their own benefit. Furthermore, the degree 
of loss aversion is a key driver of PLR (see Model (5)). That is, a higher degree of loss 
aversion leads to a smaller PLR. 
If we ignore subjects’ social value orientation (models (1), (3), (5)), it becomes obvious 
that the variable Trade experience is generally not significant. Nevertheless, trading expe-
rience is a crucial factor for the emergence of disposition effects. This becomes obvious if 
we incorporate subjects’ social-value orientation in our analyses. In Model (2), the signifi-
cant positive interaction term of Responsibility x LOWexperience x Prosocial Model 
demonstrates that the treatment effect is caused by inexperienced subjects characterized by 
a prosocial social-value orientation who exhibit more pronounced disposition effects when 
trading for others. Wald tests comparing the coefficients from Model (2), reveal that pro-
social traders with low trading experience in the Responsibility treatment additionally show 
a higher DE than high experienced prosocial (p = 0.088) and low experienced individualis-
tic (p = 0.049) investors in the Responsibility treatment. This again confirms our main find-
ings of results 1a and 1b. Turning to Model (4), it becomes clear that this behavior is in-
duced by an increased realization of capital gains by this group of investors, when trading 
affects a decision target. More precisely, we find a positive significant effect of the interac-
tion of Responsibility x LOWexperience x Prosocial on PGR. Model (4) indicates that the 
elevated DE for the prosocial investors with low trading experience in the Responsibility 
treatment is caused by the greater proportion of divested paper gains in this group.  
Result 4: The driving force of the treatment effect can be attributed to a significantly high-
er proportion of gains realized in the responsibility treatment. This behavior is initiated by 
inexperienced traders with prosocial value orientation. 
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4.4 The role of investor motivation 
A further possible explanation for the treatment effect could be differences in investors’ 
motivation to trade, as their performance in Responsibility will be revealed to a matched 
partner (Pelster and Hofmann, 2017). We assume that trader motivation could be reflected 
by the number of trades processed, as trading is associated with effort. Besides the first 
indications from Table 2 regarding the trading volume, we provide a more detailed over-
view of the trading volume. Table 4 focuses on the data of the Responsibility treatment. It 
illustrates the trading volume of traders with high and low trading experience in the Re-
sponsibility treatment.  
Table 4: Trading volume in different subsamples of the Responsibility treatment 
 
Trading volume
a) 
 p-value
b)
 
 Trading volume
a)
 
low experienced 
p-value
b)
 
 High  
experienced 
Low  
experienced 
  Indivi-
dualistic 
Pro-
social 
 
Total trades 226.3 
(122.1) 
241.0 
(161.3) 
0.822  211.9 
(153.5) 
270.1 
(167.0) 
0.244 
Buying volume 146.1 
(69.6) 
151.3 
(90.2) 
0.774  135.4 
(87.1) 
167.2 
(92.4) 
0. 203 
Selling (gains) volume 45.7 
(39.7) 
49.6 
(53.3) 
0.778  31.8 
(29.2) 
67.4 
(65.5) 
0. 083 
Selling (losses) volume 33.6 
(34.5) 
37.9 
(45.9) 
0.727  44.1 
(60.7) 
31.8 
(23.3) 
0.930 
Note: Standard deviation in parentheses. The table compares trading volume based on subjects’ trading expe-
rience (columns 1–3) and based on the SVO of subjects with low trading experience (columns 4–5).  
a) Number of traded shares in all stocks.  
b) According to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test. 
It becomes obvious that the total trading volume does not differ between the different lev-
els of trading experience. A conspicuous finding can be observed when focusing on the 
trading volume of subjects based on their SVO. That is, prosocial inexperienced subjects 
even process a weakly significant higher trading volume of capital gains (67.4) compared 
to individualistic subjects (31.8) (Wilcoxon signed-rank test, p = 0.083). This underlines 
the finding that the significant treatment effect of the PGR only arises because prosocial 
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traders with low trading experience process a higher trading volume. Hence, we find that 
this group is even more motivated when trading on behalf of others.  
A further method to control for investors’ motivation is to focus on their understanding of 
the stock types. In the Weber and Camerer (1998) framework subjects know that each of 
the six stocks follows a distinct type, i.e., stocks with a better rating are more likely to in-
crease. As a consequence, subjects have the possibility to identify a stock’s type by count-
ing the number of stock price increases/decreases. Our idea is that, if an investor is moti-
vated to achieve a good performance, she should therefore try to find out the stocks’ char-
acteristics. Subjects’ evaluations of the stock types are measured by the guess score we 
elicited in the experiment. It turns out that Mann-Whitney tests focusing on the guess 
scores after period 7 and 14 find no significant differences between experienced and inex-
perienced investors (period 7: p = 0.371; period 14: p = 0.210). The same holds when 
comparing guess scores between prosocial vs. individualistic subjects (period 7: p = 0.761; 
period 14: p = 0.316). This adds further support against the idea that inexperienced proso-
cial investors exhibit more pronounced disposition effects because of a lack of motivation.  
Result 5: The higher disposition effect of inexperienced traders with prosocial value orien-
tation in Responsibility is not driven by less motivation of these individuals. 
5. Conclusion 
This paper analyzes the disposition effect of investors who decide on behalf of other sub-
jects. A special interest was whether prosocial investors in this case exhibit more pro-
nounced disposition effects, as they feel closer to the other person. We explored this re-
search question experimentally, as this enables us to tackle possible obstacles which are 
hard to isolate in the field. First, the setup allows us to focus on the pure effects of intrinsic 
motivation from the investors’ side. That is, the experimental framework of a Responsibil-
ity treatment avoids by design that extrinsic motives from the investors’ side could be a 
reason for behavioral changes in social trading. More precisely, as investors in Responsi-
bility are not paid based on their trading performance, it can be ruled out that they strive for 
a (high) own monetary benefit. Moreover, we exogenously match the decision targets to 
the investors. Thus, it cannot be that investors have extrinsic motives to attract traders that 
are following them. The latter can play an important role in online social trading platforms 
where ‘leading’ traders receive bonuses for each trader who decides to copy their trades 
(Pelster and Hofmann, 2017).  
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The results support our hypothesis, i.e., we observe stronger disposition effects when in-
vestors’ trading decisions affect the payoff of other subjects. More concrete, inexperienced 
traders with a prosocial attitude more readily sell capital gains when taking decisions for 
others. By contrast, no treatment effect can be found for individualistic subjects and deci-
sion-makers with a high degree of trading experience. We find that deciding on behalf of 
others abolishes the correlation of individual loss aversion and the disposition effect (An-
dersson et al., 2014) which, however, has no effect on treatment differences. We focus on a 
couple of robustness checks on investors’ trading volume and their understanding of the 
stock types to proxy their motivation when deciding for others. However, we find no evi-
dence that inexperienced investors in the Responsibility treatment could be less motivated. 
That is, no differences in trading volume or between the precision of guess scores can be 
found for the different trader types.  
The results are exciting, as we can conclude that even intrinsic motives (which may be 
shared by friends) are sufficient to cause pronounced disposition effects when deciding for 
others. It is noteworthy that social distance in our anonymous design should rather be less 
distinctive. Hence, it is likely that the effects are more pronounced when investors decide 
for their friends and therefore know the other person. Our findings have practical implica-
tions for everyday trading. That is, private investors who consider delegating their invest-
ment decisions to friends should be cautious, as prosocial investors with a low degree of 
trading experience exhibit pronounced disposition effects. Referring to the findings of 
Shapira and Venezia (2001), we conclude that professional traders exhibit lower disposi-
tion effects for two reasons: First, they are characterized by a higher degree of trading ex-
perience. Second, we speculate that individualistic persons might self-select to a career as a 
trader. Further research could add treatments testing whether a monetary incentive for 
traders deciding on behalf of others affects the results, and in which direction. It could be 
expected that the monetary incentive does not affect the (inexperienced prosocial) traders 
and they further perform worse.   
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Abstract 
Loss aversion is allegedly one of the key drivers for behavioral biases in the financial eco-
nomics context, e.g. the disposition effect and the equity premium puzzle. However, while 
loss aversion is important, little research has investigated its determinants. Therefore, loss 
aversion was elicited using an incentivized task. Results reveal that lower loss aversion is 
associated with greater prenatal testosterone exposure, as measured by the 2D:4D. Surpris-
ingly, this correlation between loss aversion and the digit ratio only holds true for the right 
hand. Furthermore, a greater number of siblings, improved math skills and the male gender 
are all associated with reduced loss aversion. The results contribute to the understanding of 
loss aversion in general and the effect of prenatal testosterone on economic preferences in 
particular. 
Keywords: Digit ratio; 2D:4D; loss aversion; gender differences. 
JEL Codes: C91, D14, D81, J16 
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Abstract 
The identification of the optimal selling time of stored goods is among the most essential 
economic decisions on a farm. Beyond monetary aspects, behavioral factors may influence 
farmers’ selling behavior. In financial economics, the disposition effect is a commonly 
observed phenomenon. It indicates that investors hold losing stocks too long, while they 
sell stocks that have increased in value too early. In the context of agriculture, this behav-
ioral bias has not been analyzed thoroughly yet. To close this research gap, we conducted 
an incentivized online experiment with 112 farmers in Germany. The experimental design 
was based on well-proven experiments from financial economics and adapted to an agri-
cultural decision context where stored goods must be sold. Farmers were provided infor-
mation on the uncertain price developments. In addition, lotteries were conducted to elicit 
farmers’ risk attitude, probability weighting, and loss aversion. Results indicate that there 
is a robust disposition effect in farmers’ selling behavior. Furthermore, more loss-averse 
farmers exhibited a higher disposition effect. 
Keywords: Disposition effect, experiments, farmers. 
JEL Codes: C91, D81. 
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Abstract 
We conducted a laboratory experiment to examine how honesty depends on social distance. 
Participants cast dice and reported the outcomes to allocate money between themselves and 
fellow students or the socially distant experimenter. They could lie about outcomes to earn 
more money. We found that dishonesty increases with social distance. However, respon-
siveness to social distance depends on personal preferences about inequity and honesty as a 
moral value. We observed selfish ‘black lies’ but not altruistic ‘white lies’ (outcomes were 
not understated to reduce inequality). Our results suggest that the reduction of social dis-
tance can promote honesty in social interactions. 
Keywords: Cheating, honesty, social distance, experiment. 
JEL Codes: C91, D63, D64. 
 
1. Introduction 
Dishonesty is common in social interaction. However, does it matter for honesty how close 
interaction partners are to each other? Dishonesty is costly because it reduces the value of 
the interaction and may even preclude it. Social distance is a likely influence on honesty 
and it is under the control of the interaction partners. It is therefore important to understand 
the role of social distance, which has largely eluded attention in prior research. We show, in 
a laboratory experiment, that dishonesty increases with social distance. Furthermore, we 
find that the effect of social distance depends on personal preferences about honesty and 
fairness. This study contributes to the growing literature that examines drivers of honesty, 
both on the personal and the situational level. It argues for the reduction of social distance 
to promote honesty in social interactions but also shows the contingency of this approach 
on personal preferences. 
Honesty is, to a large extent, a matter of personal preferences (Gibson et al., 2013). Exper-
imental research has consistently found individuals that did not lie despite strong economic 
incentives for dishonesty, whereas others lied readily. Motivated by pure aversion to lying, 
some even disregard potential favorable consequences of lying for themselves or others 
(López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2013). In economic terms, there is an intrinsic cost to lying, 
which is prohibitively high for some (Arbel et al., 2014; Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017). 
Refuting the idea of a simple distinction between economic and ethical types, Gibson et al. 
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(2013) traced honesty back to heterogeneous preferences. Specifically, they showed that 
the concept of protected values explains variation in honesty. People differ in how much 
they consider honesty a protected value, which they are reluctant to trade off for other val-
ues. 
Although individual preferences matter, lying depends heavily on the situation. People lie 
to others in the context of social interactions, and most respond to situational factors. In 
particular, Erat and Gneezy (2012) showed that people, on average, consider the conse-
quences of their lies for themselves and others. Their taxonomy of lies includes ‘selfish 
black lies,’ which benefit the liar at the expense of others, but also ‘altruistic white lies,’ 
which help others at the expense of the liar. A host of economic studies have shed light on 
social influences on honesty other than the consequences of lying (Rosenbaum et al., 
2014). Important findings include that people lie more readily in groups than alone 
(Kocher et al., 2018) and that lying is responsive to the magnitude of incentives for dis-
honesty (Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017). Hence, while few people never lie, most are ready 
to lie when it pays off. 
Social distance—i.e., how close agents are to each other (Akerlof, 1997)—has barely been 
considered as a potential influence on honesty. By contrast, several studies have document-
ed the effect of social distance on the outcome of social interactions. For instance, Buchan 
et al. (2006) showed that other-regarding preferences, such as trust, reciprocity, or altruism, 
are more pronounced with a lower degree of social distance. Eckel and Grossman (1996) 
found that altruism in dictator games varied with the distance between the dictator and the 
recipient, who were either anonymous students or reputable charities. Charness and 
Gneezy (2008) found that dictators are more willing to give to recipients as social distance 
decreases. Similarly, Zultan (2012) reported more cooperation in the ultimatum game after 
pre-game face-to-face communication, which apparently reduces social distance. 
While these results suggest an interaction between social distance and other-regarding 
preferences, evidence for a potential interaction between social distance and honesty is 
limited. Related experiments use the sender–receiver game, where the sender has private 
information about two options and sends the receiver a potentially dishonest message about 
which option to choose (e.g., Erat and Gneezy, 2012; Lundquist et al., 2009; Sutter, 2009). 
Thus, van Zant and Kray (2014) found that pre-game face-to-face communication increas-
es senders’ honesty. However, the sender–receiver game involves strategic considerations 
and leaves the final decision to the receiver. In die-rolling experiments, in turn, participants 
V Be close to me and I will be honest: How social distance influences honesty 
46 
 
always lie to the socially distant experimenter. Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017) and Meub et 
al. (2016) had participants interact either with the experimenter or other participants, but 
had them make binary choices and did not observe lies on the individual level. 
To explore the effect of social distance on honesty and, at the same time, account for the 
potential interaction with preferences about fairness, we combined a dictator game with the 
task of rolling a die and reporting the outcome to earn money (Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi, 2013). The outcome of the die roll can be seen as a ‘suggestion’ for the dictator of 
how to allocate money between herself and someone else. The dictator could override this 
suggestion to earn more (or less) money, but needed then to misstate the outcome—i.e., lie 
about it. Participants’ reports depended therefore on their preferences for honesty and fair-
ness. To manipulate social distance, we had them allocate money either between them-
selves and other participants or between themselves and the experimenter (Kajackaite and 
Gneezy, 2017). Like  Kocher et al. (2018), we had them perform this task on the computer, 
which allowed us to observe honesty on the individual level. 
Our findings contribute to prior research in several ways. First, we establish that honesty 
depends on social distance. Exploiting variation in outcomes, we do not find, in turn, that 
dishonesty is driven by inequality. Second, we tie honesty to heterogeneity in personal 
preferences about fairness and honesty. In particular, our data indicate that fairness con-
cerns and social distance interact to influence honesty. This observation is in line with the 
finding that social distance affects altruism and cooperative behavior (Charness and 
Gneezy, 2008; Eckel and Grossman, 1996; Hoffman et al., 1996). Third, the observation of 
lies on the individual level enables us to identify ‘altruistic white lies,’ which reduce ine-
quality at the expense of the liar (Erat and Gneezy, 2012). Such lies have been observed in 
sender–receiver games, but not in other settings, such as the die-rolling task. 
The influence of social distance on honesty is interesting because it relates to most interac-
tions that involve honesty. For example, public authorities usually appear as a distant and 
impersonal interaction partner to people, and honesty is indeed a major concern in tax col-
lection. In this and other areas, people often interact through intermediaries, who increase 
social distance between the interaction partners. More generally speaking, the wide use of 
the internet has profoundly simplified but also depersonalized communication. Our find-
ings suggest the reduction of social distance as an option to consider when honesty is an 
issue. In particular, this may be a worthwhile alternative to control mechanisms, which 
have been found to crowd out trust and social behaviors (Falk and Kosfeld, 2006). 
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2. Theoretical framework and hypotheses 
Starting from a die-rolling task, we derive a simple utility function to model the agent’s 
reporting choices (Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017). We enhance the model by incorporating 
social distance. In the die-rolling task, the agent observes and reports a state of nature t 
(i.e., the outcome 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, or 6 of rolling the die), where different states are associated 
with different monetary payoffs. The agent’s payoff m depends on whether she reports 
truthfully the state that she observes (t' = t), resulting in payoff mt, or a different state 
(t' ≠ t), resulting in payoff mt'. If the agent misreports the state of nature by claiming it is 
more favorable for her than it actually is, lying earns her a monetary surplus of mt' − mt. At 
the same time, however, lying also has a psychological cost Ci.
1
 Depending on how much 
the agent minds lying, this cost can be anywhere between zero and prohibitively high 
(Ci ∈ [0, ∞]). Taking into account both the benefits and costs of lying, the agent lies if her 
utility from lying is greater than from being honest. That is, she lies if 
 mt' − Ci  > mt. (1) 
While lying depends on personal preferences for honesty, it often also affects others in 
some way (Erat and Gneezy, 2012). For example, a lie to increase an agent’s payoff might 
reduce another agent’s payoff. Relating the agent’s report of t or t' to the maximum out-
come k, so that t and t' are within [0, k], individual j’s outcome is then mk − t if 𝑖 is honest, 
and mk − t' if she is dishonest. As j’s outcome depends on i’s report, questions arise about 
how i’s preference for honesty interacts with her social distance to j. Based on the observa-
tions of the effect of social distance on altruistic behavior (Buchan et al., 2006; Eckel and 
Grossman, 1996) and the effect of pre-game face-to-face communication on honesty in 
sender–receiver games (van Zant and Kray, 2014), we assume that the intrinsic cost of ly-
ing is a function of social distance. That is, people are more reluctant to lie to others who 
are closer to them. The individual psychological cost of lying can then be modeled as the 
sum of some basic cost of lying BCi, which does not depend on social distance, and some 
additional cost, which is a function of social distance. Hence, we refine our notion of Ci in 
equation (1) to be calculated as:  
                                                 
1
 Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017) distinguish intrinsic costs Ci and extrinsic costs γi of lying, where the latter 
arise from being exposed as a liar. Our experimental framework keeps γi constant. 
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 Ci = BCi + f(SDi). (2) 
Drawing on the aforementioned evidence, we propose the following hypothesis regarding 
the effect of social distance on honesty: 
H1: Dishonesty increases with social distance. 
Given the cost of lying, people would typically lie to earn monetary benefits that compen-
sate this cost. Die-rolling experiments offer little empirical evidence, in turn, that people lie 
to reduce their payoff (Gneezy et al., 2018; Kocher et al., 2018). The only exception is a 
study by Utikal and Fischbacher (2013), whose data suggest that nuns told ‘disadvanta-
geous lies’ in their experiment. It seems that the nuns in Utikal and Fischbacher’s experi-
ment paradoxically lied to dodge the suspicion of lying, which truthfully high reports of 
their honesty might have raised. It should be noted, though, that regular die-rolling experi-
ments do not allow us to observe lying on the individual level. Hence, there might be dis-
advantageous lies that are masked by a higher rate of advantageous lies. 
Moreover, these experiments did not manipulate social distance. Instead, social distance 
between the participant and the experimenter was uniformly large. Kajackaite and Gneezy 
(2017) manipulated social distance in the sense that they had participants either interact 
with other participants or the experimenter. However, they did not observe lies on the indi-
vidual level because they wanted to exclude that participants believed they could possibly 
be exposed as liars. There is evidence, though, that people lie for altruistic reasons from 
other experiments, where participants, unlike in die-rolling experiments, interact with each 
other rather than the socially distant experimenter. Specifically, Erat and Gneezy (2012) 
observed that senders lied to increase receivers’ payoffs, even when this reduced their own 
payoffs in the sender–receiver game. They named these lies, which were told by 33 percent 
of their sample, ‘altruistic white lies.’ Recollecting the evidence for disadvantageous and 
altruistic white lies, we derive two hypotheses to predict how social distance and favorable 
inequality combine to affect honesty: 
H2a: Under a high degree of social distance, agents do not lie to reduce their own out-
come for the benefit of others. 
H2b: Under a low degree of social distance, agents lie to reduce their own outcome for 
altruistic reasons. 
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3. Experimental design 
We conducted our experiment with two treatment conditions in the laboratory. The experi-
ment was programmed in z-Tree (Fischbacher, 2007). We collected data from 120 partici-
pants (60 in either condition), whom we recruited with ORSEE (Greiner, 2015). One con-
dition required an additional 60 ‘passive’ participants, from whom we did not collect any 
data. To describe the experimental design, we first explain the die-rolling task to test par-
ticipants’ preferences for honesty. We then depict our manipulation of social distance. Fi-
nally, we provide a brief overview of the additional tasks that we implemented as part of 
our post-treatment questions. 
3.1 Die-rolling task 
Participants’ primary task consisted of rolling a die and reporting the outcome, which 
earned them money. Participants could usually earn more money by misreporting the out-
come than by reporting it truthfully, which created an incentive for them to lie. This design 
was adopted from Kocher et al. (2018), who computerized Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi’s 
(2013) classical die-rolling task. 
Participants first read the instructions (Appendices B.1 and B.2) and then answered com-
prehension questions to make sure that they understood their task (Appendix B.3). Next, 
they launched a short video of a six-sided die being rolled on their computer screen, result-
ing in one of six possible outcomes (, , , , , or ). To mimic a real die roll, we 
created a random mechanism to ensure that each outcome was equally likely to occur, and 
participants were informed of this. They also knew that the dice were rolled independently 
for each of them so that they could not infer the others’ outcomes from their own. After 
each die was rolled, the video was frozen so that the outcome remained visible for about 12 
seconds. Participants then typed the outcome that they wanted to report into a field and 
submitted it. Regardless of the actual outcome, they could report any number—‘1,’ ‘2,’ ‘3,’ 
‘4,’ ‘5,’ or ‘6’—, which allowed them to be honest as much as to be dishonest. 
Participants’ payoff ultimately depended on their reported outcome and not the actual out-
come of their die roll. Technically speaking, our experiment resembled therefore a dictator 
game, where the proposer or dictator splits some amount between herself and someone 
else. Unlike in the dictator game, however, where she splits the amount at her own discre-
tion, the die-rolling task can be taken to suggest a random split. The participant could al-
ways neglect this suggestion and, like a dictator, implement any split by just reporting a 
different number than the outcome. This, however, required her to misstate the outcome—
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i.e., to lie about it. We told participants specifically that their report determined their share 
of a fixed amount of €10. Table 1 shows how reports translated into payoffs. Clearly, a 
payoff maximizer would always report ‘5,’ regardless of the actual outcome, to earn the 
maximum payoff of €10. 
Table 1: Payoff structure of die-rolling task 
Report Participant’s share Remainder 
‘1’ 0€2 0€8 
‘2’ 0€4 0€6 
‘3’ 0€6 0€4 
‘4’ 0€8 0€2 
‘5’ €10 0€0 
‘6’ 0€0 €10 
 
Unlike in Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi’s (2013) original experiment, in which lying could 
not be observed on the individual level, Kocher et al.’s (2018) computerized version 
provided us with richer data, as we recorded both the actual and the reported outcomes. 
However, knowing that the outcome in the video was determined by the software, partici-
pants could easily infer that their lies could be detected by the experimenter, and instruc-
tions did not claim or suggest that the experimenter would not know the actual in addition 
to the reported outcomes. Of course, participation was anonymous so that lies could only 
be traced back to participants’ working stations but never to any individual person. Kocher 
et al. (2018, p. 3) acknowledge that the observability of dishonesty might reduce the level 
of lying. That said, prior evidence suggests that complete observability and complete pri-
vacy have only marginal effects on the absolute extent of lying (Bäker and Mechtel, 2015; 
Gneezy et al., 2018; Houser et al., 2016).
2
 Nonetheless, we confined our analysis to rela-
tive comparisons. 
3.2 Manipulation of Social Distance 
We implemented a between-subject design with two treatment conditions. In the Low De-
gree of Social Distance condition, participants reported or misreported their outcomes to 
split €10 between themselves and ‘passive’ participants, who served as recipients. The re-
                                                 
2
 It should also be noted that any effect of observability works against H1, which predicts that dishonesty 
increases with social distance. Our estimate of dishonesty in the High Degree of Social Distance condition 
is therefore best seen as a lower bound. 
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cipients were other participants from the same pool of students.
3
 In the High Degree of 
Social Distance condition, they split €10 between themselves and the experimenter. 
In the Low Degree of Social Distance sessions, participants were randomly assigned to one 
of two rooms when entering the laboratory. The participants in one room rolled dice and 
reported outcomes just like the participants in the High Degree of Social Distance treat-
ment, as described in the previous section. The recipients in the other room were told about 
the participants’ task while they waited for them to roll dice and submit reports. After re-
ceiving their instructions, the only task of the recipients consisted of drawing numbers that 
assigned a random participant who split the €10 to each of them. We had twice as many 
participants in the Low Degree of Social Distance sessions as to the High Degree of Social 
Distance sessions—one half of them participants, the other half recipients—and assigned 
one recipient to each participant. Hence, the number of participants who split the €10 were 
held constant across conditions. Participants and recipients were randomly matched and 
interacted anonymously. 
The participants were told that their report would determine how a sum of €10 would be 
split between themselves and a recipient. Specifically, the ‘participant in the other room’ 
would receive the remainder of the €10. In the High Degree of Social Distance treatment, 
there were no recipients and the remainder of the €10 went to the experimenter instead. 
Clearly, social distance between fellow students is lower than between students and the 
experimenter. That said, anonymity saved participants from having to justify their deci-
sions to recipients in the Low Social Distance condition. Table 2 summarizes the differ-
ences between the conditions. 
Table 2: Comparison of the two treatments 
 Treatment 
 High Degree of  
Social Distance 
Low Degree of   
Social Distance 
Participants per session 10 20 
Reporting participants 10 10 
Passive participants 00 10 
Remainder (Table 1) Remains with the experimenter Goes to a passive participant 
 
  
                                                 
3
 We use the term ‘recipient’ for convenience in the paper. The instructions refer to all participants just as 
‘participants’ and, to distinguish participants in one room from those in the other room, ‘participants in the 
other room’ (see Appendices A.1 and A.2). 
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3.3 Additional experimental tasks 
After rolling the dice and reporting the outcomes, participants answered post-treatment 
questions. These questions included an incentivized multiple price list task, which we 
adopted from Blanco et al. (2011) to measure the participants’ compassion parameter β 
(Appendix B.4). Participants were told only after completing the dice game and before 
starting the post-treatment questions that their answers to these questions could earn them 
additional money. 
In addition, we had participants indicate their agreement with several statements adopted 
from Gibson et al. (2013) to measure the extent to which honesty was a ‘protected value’ 
for them. A value is ‘protected’ when an individual is reluctant to trade it for other values. 
In particular, someone who considers honesty a protected value would refrain from lying to 
earn money. By contrast, values that are not protected can readily be traded for each other 
(Appendix B.5). Finally, we gathered demographics as potential controls. 
4. Results 
4.1 Summary statistics 
Our main interest was participants’ honesty in reporting their outcomes. Figure 1 depicts 
the actual outcomes as well as the reported outcomes for each participant under both condi-
tions. The figure shows that many participants reported their outcomes truthfully, placing 
them on the main diagonal. Under both conditions, there were, however, ‘liars’ who mis-
stated their outcomes. In particular, lying was more frequent in the High Degree of Social 
Distance condition. It is striking that, whenever participants misreported their outcomes, 
they overstated rather than understated their outcome to earn more rather than give up any 
money. 
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Figure 1: Outcomes and reports. 
Note: Regardless of the outcome, a report of ‘1’ earned the participant €2, a report of ‘2’ earned €4, and so 
forth. A report of ‘6,’ however, resulted in zero payoff. 
 
As a measure of dishonesty, we related the additional payoff that a participant created by 
overstating her outcome to the maximum additional payoff that she could have possibly 
created. For example, the participant in the left panel of Figure 1, who reported a ‘3’ for an 
outcome of  under the High Degree of Social Distance condition created a relative addi-
tional payoff of .5 = (3 − 1) ÷ (5 − 1). While the range of the (absolute) additional payoff 
depends on the actual outcome (e.g., it is 5 with an outcome of  and a report of ‘5’; 4 
with an outcome of  and a report of ‘5,’ etc.), the relative difference is restricted to range 
from 0 to 1.
 
Obviously, the relative difference is 0 for participants whose outcome is  and 
who therefore cannot lie, unless they understate their outcome (which none of them did 
according to Figure 1). 
The relative additional payoff averaged .11 (SD .30) in the Low Degree of Social Distance 
condition and .25 (SD .43) in the High Degree of Social Distance condition. Similarly, the 
average proportion of liars was .12 (SD .32) in the former condition and .27 (SD .45) in the 
latter. The numbers are necessarily similar since most liars reported an outcome of ‘5’ in 
order to maximize their payoff rather than choosing a value somewhere between their actu-
al outcome and the maximum outcome. Figure 1 shows exactly two participants in each 
condition who overstated their outcomes but reported a value less than ‘5.’ 
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4.2 Hypothesis tests 
H1 states that honesty increases when social distance decreases and vice versa. Figure 1 
suggests that this is indeed the case because there were more participants above the main 
diagonal in the High Degree of Social Distance than in the Low Degree of Social Distance 
condition. In line with this observation, the Mann–Whitney reveals that the relative differ-
ence between reports and outcomes is higher in under a high than under a low degree of 
social distance on average and thus confirms H1 (.25 > .11, p = .033). Likewise, Fisher’s 
exact test reveals that the proportion of liars was significantly larger in the former than in 
the latter condition (.27 > .12, p = .062).
4
 Hence, there are more liars and there is more 
lying under a high degree of social distance compared to a low degree of social distance.
5
 
Note that these two effects—the increase in lying and the increase in the proportion of li-
ars—cannot be distinguished statistically. Besides the aforementioned two people in each 
condition who overstated their outcomes but reported something below ‘5,’ all other partic-
ipants claimed the maximum payoff once they decided to lie. Therefore, while there were 
certainly more liars under a high degree of social distance, we did not find that these liars 
also felt encouraged to tell more extreme lies as social distance increased and vice versa.
6
 
This observation is in line with related research, which shows that people care about how 
they are perceived by others when they are caught lying (Gneezy et al., 2018; Kocher et al., 
2018). Knowing that lies could always be detected by the experimenter, participants either 
refrained from lying or, once they had decided to lie, did not bother reporting anything 
below ‘5’ to increase the probability of being perceived as an honest person despite lying. 
One might expect that reduced social distance leads to lies that balance outcomes as fair-
ness preferences are more pronounced for peers (López-Pérez, 2012). However, we found 
no evidence that fairness considerations in a classical sense (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) me-
diate the effect of social distance on honesty. Figure 2, which depicts the percentage of 
liars for each outcome both under a low and high degree of social distance, illustrates this 
result. It shows that the percentage of liars declined in both conditions as the outcome ap-
proached , which paid the participant more than the recipient or experimenter. This trend 
is eclipsed, however, by a large number of participants who overstated the outcome  in 
                                                 
4
 In the following we use Mann–Whitney test to compare relative additional payoffs and the Fisher’s exact 
test to compare the proportion of liars. 
5
 Regression estimates confirm these results, both with and without covariates (see Appendix B.6). 
6
 The relative additional payoff created by lying is slightly higher for the high degree of social distance 
treatment. However, a Mann–Whitney test for the subsample of liars does not show this difference to be 
statistically significant (p = 0.448). 
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the Low Degree of Social Distance condition. Moreover, all participants reported the out-
come  honestly in the High Degree of Social Distance condition, earning them zero pay-
off. Hence, we did not find that honesty hinges on outcome inequality. 
 
Figure 2: Outcomes and lying. 
Note: Percentage of lying participants for each outcome and condition. A report of ‘1’ earned the participant 
€2, a report of ‘2’ earned €4, and so forth. A report of ‘6,’ however, resulted in zero payoff. 
 
H2a and H2b refer specifically to favorable (t > k − t) as opposed to unfavorable inequality 
(t < k − t)—i.e., the situation in which the actual outcome favors the participant over the 
recipient or experimenter. While these predictions do not allow for a direct statistical test, 
Figure 1 readily confirms H2a and refutes H2b. The figure shows that participants never 
lied to reduce favorable inequality, which would require them to understate their outcomes. 
There was no participant who understated her outcome, neither under a high nor low de-
gree of social distance. This result is in line with H2a, but contradicts H2b. 
Given that participants did not lie to reduce favorable inequality, we examine whether they 
lied more under unfavorable than under favorable inequality depending on social distance. 
Specifically, while participants can always increase their payoffs by overstating their out-
comes, lying is arguably easier to justify when it reduces unfavorable inequality rather than 
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increases favorable inequality (i.e., envy is supposed to be more substantial than compas-
sion). Figure 1 shows that more participants lied across conditions when their outcomes 
were , , or  than when they were , , or , leaving them with less than half of the 
€10 in the former case. However, neither the difference in the percentage of liars 
(.25 > .14) nor the relative increase in payoffs because of lying (.23 > .13) was significant. 
That said, the difference in the percentage of liars in the High Degree of Social Distance 
condition comes close to being significant (.37 > .18, p = .144). 
4.3 Preferences for honesty and compassion 
To test for potential factors causing the main effect of social distance, we conducted further 
analyses. First, we examined how honesty depends on the extent to which participants con-
sider it a protected value which they would not trade for other values. We split the sample 
at the median of the protected values scores, which we determined according to Gibson et 
al. (2013), to distinguish participants who are more and less reluctant to trade honesty for 
other values. Unsurprisingly, the relative increase in payoffs (.10 < .25, p = .015) because 
of dishonesty and the percentage of liars (.10 < .28, p = .019) were overall lower among 
participants with an above-median score. This said, participants who are more inclined to 
trade honesty should be particularly responsive to the effect of social distance. The in-
crease in payoffs because of dishonesty (.12 < .41, p = .006) and the percentage of liars 
(.15 < .46, p = .010) were indeed significantly lower under a low as opposed to a high de-
gree of social distance among these participants. 
Second, to follow up on our analysis of outcome inequality, which we mentioned did not 
mediate the effect of social distance on honesty, we investigated the influence of fairness 
preferences. Specifically, we distinguished between participants with high and low levels 
of compassion, which quantifies the disutility of favorable inequality (Fehr and Schmidt, 
1999). We used Blanco et al.’s (2011) multiple price list task to obtain the compassion pa-
rameter β for each participant and split our sample again at the median. We found that the 
relative additional payoff obtained by lying and the portion of liars differed between condi-
tions for participants with above-median aversion to favorable inequality. Specifically, in 
the High Degree of Social Distance condition, the relative difference (.23 > .03, p = .020) 
and the proportion of liars (.25 > .03, p = .028) were significantly higher compared to the 
Low Degree of Social Distance condition. In contrast, neither the relative difference 
(.26 > .17, p = .368) nor the proportion of liars (.28 > .19, p = .542) differed significantly 
V Be close to me and I will be honest: How social distance influences honesty 
57 
 
between conditions for participants with below-median levels of β.7 This observation sug-
gests that the effect of social distance on honesty at least partially interacts with fairness 
preferences. 
Taken together, these results imply that the effect of social distance on honesty is driven by 
people with specific preferences about honesty and fairness—namely participants who are 
willing to trade honesty for other values (i.e., whose protected values score is low for hon-
esty) and participants who have a strong aversion against favorable inequality (i.e., high 
levels of the compassion parameter β). As a final analysis, we examined whether the effect 
of social distance on honesty can be attributed, more specifically, to participants with a 
combination of these preferences. In support of this conjecture, the difference of the rela-
tive additional payoffs (.00 < .45, p = .003) and the percentage of liars (.00 < .50, p = .005) 
between the High Degree of Social Distance and the Low Degree of Social Distance condi-
tion turned out significantly higher among those participants who combined these prefer-
ences.
8
 We retain therefore that social distance, which is a factor that arises from the situa-
tion, interacts with preferences that pertain to the person. 
5. Conclusion 
Honesty depends on both personal and situational factors. The primary focus of this study 
was on the situational factor of social distance. Specifically, we had participants in a labor-
atory experiment allocate money between themselves and someone else, who was either 
another participant or the experimenter. Consequently, the other participant (i.e., a fellow 
student), was socially closer to the participant than the experimenter. The allocation in-
volved honesty because participants received a random ‘suggestion’ of how to allocate 
money and they had to lie in order to depart from this suggestion. Technically speaking, 
our experiment combined a dictator game with Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi’s (2013) die-
rolling task. The outcome of the die roll suggests how money should be allocated, but par-
ticipants can misreport outcomes to achieve a different allocation. 
We predicted and found that dishonesty increases with social distance. Specifically, partic-
ipants were less willing to lie at the expense of fellow students than at the expense of the 
experimenter. Evidence for the effect of fairness is less conclusive. We did not see outcome 
                                                 
7
 The same result holds for participants whose β exceeded the threshold of .5 from the literature (Blanco et 
al., 2011; Müller & Rau, 2016). The median of β was .53 in our sample and therefore close to this thresh-
old. 
8
 Again, regressions—without and with covariates—confirm this result (see Table B.2 in Appendix B.6). 
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inequality mediate the effect of social distance on honesty. That said, we found that partici-
pants lied more readily to increase their payoff when it was less than half of the available 
money, and they never lied to benefit others, irrespective of social distance. Hence, we 
observed what Erat and Gneezy (2012) call selfish ‘black lies’ but not altruistic ‘white lies.’ 
Beyond these results, which were related to the situation, participants’ personal preferences 
about honesty and fairness offered further insights into the drivers of our findings. 
Specifically, additional analyses revealed that social distance did not matter to participants 
who tended to consider honesty a protected value, which they would not trade for other 
values. The effect of social distance was therefore only significant among those partici-
pants who were inclined to trade honesty and who therefore responded to the different situ-
ations that arose from our manipulation. Likewise, the effect of social distance turned out 
to depend on participants’ aversion to favorable inequality. Only participants who were 
sufficiently uneasy with inequality, even when it favored themselves over others, respond-
ed to our manipulation. These analyses reveal that the effect of social distance on honesty 
is mainly driven by the combination of personal preferences.  
Taken together, our results offer evidence that social distance interacts with personal pref-
erences about honesty and fairness to influence honesty. Further research is needed to im-
prove our understanding of this interaction. In particular, future investigations may use 
tasks that offer participants a richer action space to allow them subtler choices. It might 
thus be possible to distinguish between different types of liars (Gneezy et al., 2013). More-
over, social distance can be manipulated in different ways. For example, participants might 
be put to cooperatively interact in order to reduce social distance before they perform the 
die-rolling task. The effect of social distance would also be interesting to investigate in the 
field, although this would make it harder to consider personal preferences. 
Prior research has shed light on contextual factors related to ours. In particular, there is 
evidence that face-to-face as opposed to anonymous interaction (Holm and Kawagoe, 
2010; van Zant and Kray, 2014) and personalized as opposed to standardized messages 
increase honesty (Cappelen et al., 2013). Participants in experiments have also been found 
to lie more often when they feel they are treated unfairly (Houser et al., 2012) and there is 
even evidence for people engaging in ‘white lies’ to benefit others (Erat and Gneezy, 2012) 
or to justify their dishonesty (Lewis et al., 2012). The effect of social distance, in turn, had 
not been directly examined yet. Social distance is arguably an important driver of honesty 
or dishonesty, though, since lying occurs in the context of social interactions. It is therefore 
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interesting to see both that dishonesty depends on social distance and that this effect hinges 
on personal preferences for honesty and fairness. 
Our findings have implications for the design of social interactions. In particular, there are 
many interactions that require honesty to a certain extent but that involve social distance. 
For example, citizens interact with ‘anonymous’ tax authorities—a case which has long 
created concerns about dishonesty. Measures to decrease social distance may be a worth-
while alternative to costly control, which is a common response to dishonesty. Likewise, 
intermediaries are often used in social interactions, such as transactions between firms. 
Although there are compelling reasons to rely on intermediaries, they also increase social 
distance and create room for dishonesty (Erat, 2013). While our results imply that social 
distance does not matter to some, it is an inexpensive means to elicit honesty from those 
who respond to it. Wherever honesty is important but hard to ensure, the reduction of so-
cial distance is worth considering as a way of promoting honesty. 
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Abstract 
In this paper, we shed light on the different moral costs of dishonesty and stealing. To ac-
complish this, we set up a die-rolling task which allowed participants to increase their own 
payout through dishonesty or theft. The results show that participants have fewer reserva-
tions about dishonesty compared to stealing, which implies higher intrinsic costs for steal-
ing. We found that gender contributes to this effect, as women distinguish significantly 
between lying and stealing, while men do not. 
Keywords: Lying, Deception, Stealing, Laboratory Experiment, Behavioral Economics. 
JEL Codes: C91, D63, D82. 
 
1. Introduction 
Immoral actions are commonplace and their consequences affect everyone in the private, 
business and public sector. Very topical demonstrations of large-scale dishonesty are the 
Volkswagen emission control defeat device (Wang et al., 2016) and the Libor manipulation 
(Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012). Volkswagen was dishonest regarding their emission values 
and thereby have harmed their customers and the public due to decreasing residual values 
of purchased cars and decreased air quality (Wang et al., 2016). The Libor manipulation, 
on the other hand, was a dishonest report of interest rates by large banks. These reports led 
to manipulated reference interest rates and damage to the global economy running into the 
millions of euros (Abrantes-Metz et al., 2012). Besides these examples of lying, stealing 
also harms the economy. The 2017 National Retail Security Survey indicated that a loss of 
$14.67 billion arises annually from inventory–related employee theft in the retail industry 
of the U.S. alone (National Retail Federation, 2017). Worldwide, there is about $48 billion 
of retail loss annually due to employee theft and about $48 billion from shoplifting (The 
Smart Cube, 2015). Such theft is mainly committed by men (Centre of Retail Research, 
2010). 
Due to the importance of immoral behavior in all of its manifestations in the economic 
context, several studies have focused on lying and stealing in different situations (see Ros-
enbaum et al., 2014). There is evidence that non-pecuniary moral costs arise from lying 
and stealing. This enhances the classical theory on immoral behavior as a product of in-
come effects and the probability of getting caught and punished (Fischbacher and Föllmi-
Heusi, 2013; Gneezy, 2005). Further research found that the intrinsic costs of lying depend 
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on the context: Kocher et al. (2018) reported that teams lie more often than individuals. 
This effect is driven by communication which seems to reduce moral costs regarding dis-
honesty. Moreover, pay schemes affect the intrinsic costs of lying. Belot and Schröder 
(2013) showed that competition fosters lying compared to fixed wage and piece-rate incen-
tives. Furthermore, participants in experiments have also been found to lie more often 
when they feel they are treated unfairly (Houser et al., 2012). The same context dependen-
cy holds true for the intrinsic costs of stealing. Greenberg (1993) revealed that unfairly 
treated participants who are underpaid show a higher tendency to steal. Moreover, it is 
more likely that people steal from their companies compared to individual coworkers, indi-
cating varying intrinsic costs of stealing which are conditional on the victim (Greenberg, 
2002). Summarizing these findings, there is evidence that costs of immoral behavior rea-
sonably depend on factors allowing the self-justification of the decisions (Gravert, 2013). 
While the framework conditions are crucial for lying as well as stealing, there has not been 
any attempt to compare the level of lying and stealing under identical incentives so far. 
However, there are two studies illustrating that such a comparison seems worthwhile. 
Gravert (2013) investigated stealing with two experimental tasks: the effort-based theft 
task according to Mazar et al. (2008) and a chance-based modified die-rolling task (Fisch-
bacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013). The author found that the rate of theft was lower in the 
die-rolling setting, as moral costs are reduced by the effort put forth in the theft task. In this 
case, effort provides a self-justification for stealing. Therefore, this contribution provides 
evidence that different experimental settings complicate a comparison of lying and stealing 
between studies. In a further study conducted by Belot and Schröder (2013), the authors 
introduced a design which allowed participants to simultaneously lie and steal from the 
experimenters. Furthermore, they compared different pay schemes using this design. Their 
results indicate that there was no evidence for theft, while lying in various forms arose and 
amounted to 10% of participants’ productivity in a previously carried out real effort task. 
Due to the different types of immoral behaviors which are possible in such a setting, steal-
ing might be the less favorable because of higher moral costs.  
To the best of our knowledge, there is no study comparing the amount of lying and stealing 
in an experiment with constant incentives and risk of being caught as a consequence of 
immoral behavior. The differentiation of the costs associated with these two immoral be-
haviors has relevant implications for social interactions and economic questions. If one of 
these immoral behaviors is associated with higher intrinsic costs for economic agents, it 
might be possible to reduce economic losses by reframing decisions in the various con-
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texts. For instance, the transfer of responsibility to agents under conditions of asymmetric 
information and consequently the changed perception of the immoral action might increase 
behavior which is in accordance with moral convictions. To address this point, our study 
contributes to the literature in two ways: 1) We investigated whether intrinsic costs of lying 
and stealing differ. To achieve this, we implemented an experimental design in which par-
ticipants in a lying treatment rolled a die on their computer screen and reported the out-
come. In contrast, participants in a stealing treatment did not report the outcome, but rather 
allocated the money in private, i.e., it was possible to steal. Participants received an enve-
lope containing the maximum possible payoff and were asked to take the money according 
to the die-rolling outcome. Based on the identical framework conditions and incentives, we 
were able to distinguish between moral costs of lying and stealing. 2) We investigated 
gender differences regarding intrinsic costs of lying versus stealing. Gender differences 
regarding the intrinsic costs of immoral behavior are a matter of discussion in the literature 
(Childs, 2012; Grosch and Rau, 2017). Results regarding a potential effect of gender on 
lying (Childs, 2012; Grosch and Rau, 2017; Gylfason et al., 2013; Houser et al., 2012; 
Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017) as well as stealing (Friesen and Gangadharan, 2013; 
Gravert, 2013) are ambiguous. Thus, we shed light on gender-specific costs of immoral 
behavior in three fields: lying, stealing and distinctions between lying and stealing. 
2. Theoretical framework and behavioral predictions 
We will first define a theoretical framework explaining dishonesty as well as stealing as 
immoral behavior from an economic point of view. This framework is based on the model 
introduced by Kajackaite and Gneezy (2017). We start by considering a situation in which 
an individual 𝑖 observes a state of nature 𝑡. This individual has the possibility to report 𝑡 
and earn the associated financial payoff 𝑚𝑡. It is also possible to report 𝑡
′, which results in 
payoff 𝑚𝑡′. The benefit of the immoral behavior then is 𝑚𝑡′ − 𝑚𝑡. 
However, immoral behavior is not solely associated with benefits. Disutility arises from 
violating a moral concept (Gneezy, 2005). These intrinsic costs are defined as 𝐶𝑖 and are 
heterogeneous across individuals but constant for each individual 𝑖 (Kajackaite and 
Gneezy, 2017). The range of 𝐶𝑖 is restricted to 0 ≤ 𝐶𝑖 ≤ ∞, where 𝐶𝑖 = 0 and 𝐶𝑖 = ∞ 
characterize an individual without any intrinsic value for moral behavior and an individual 
with pure aversion to immoral behavior, respectively (López-Pérez and Spiegelman, 2013). 
A second disutility arises from immoral behavior if the individual 𝑖 is exposed when acting 
immorally. This disutility can be described by a function 𝑓(𝑚𝑡′ , 𝑚𝑡, 𝑝𝑖) which is increasing 
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with the probability 𝑝𝑖 of being exposed and the size of the immoral action 𝑚𝑡′ − 𝑚𝑡 
(Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017). Individuals are heterogeneous regarding their disutility of 
getting caught. Therefore, we denoted this by including parameter 𝛾𝑖 with 𝛾𝑖 ≥ 0. 
Consequently, an individual will take immoral action whenever: 
  𝑚𝑡′ − 𝐶𝑖 − 𝛾𝑖𝑓(𝑚𝑡′ , 𝑚𝑡 , 𝑝𝑖) > 𝑚𝑡 . (1) 
Starting from this theoretical framework, it becomes obvious that, on the one hand, incen-
tives influence immoral behavior, and, on the other hand, intrinsic as well as extrinsic costs 
of immorality can influence a participant’s decision to state 𝑡′ instead of 𝑡. With this in 
mind, our experimental design becomes relevant. We held 𝛾𝑖 and 𝑚𝑡′ constant across 
treatments, but shifted the responsibility for the assignment of money, i.e., enabling lying 
in one experimental setting and stealing in another.  
A review of the relevant literature does not yield information regarding the assumption of 
varying intrinsic costs associated with lying and stealing. In Table 1, we provide a brief 
overview about honesty levels in studies using self-reported outcomes (e.g. Fischbacher 
and Föllmi-Heusi, 2013) and theft tasks (e.g. Mazar et al., 2008). Here, self-reported out-
comes measure lying, while theft tasks disclose the proportion of theft. It becomes obvious 
that honesty levels in both tasks are rather comparable. This is underlined by the literature 
review of Rosenbaum et al. (2014), which derived average full honesty levels from re-
viewed studies. They indicate overall full honesty of 52.9% for self-reported outcomes (6 
observations) and 64.7% for theft tasks (8 observations), both with a relatively large 
spread: 33.5% - 74.0% for self-reported outcomes and 37.3% - 85.0% for theft tasks. 
However, the studies of Belot and Schröder (2013) as well as Gravert (2013) indicate that a 
direct comparison of lying and stealing might be recommendable. Gravert (2013) found 
that self-reported outcome tasks reduce stealing compared to an effort-based theft task. 
Furthermore, providing the possibility to lie and steal simultaneously (Belot and Schröder, 
2013) leads to the avoidance of stealing by participants. Thus, we assume that the intrinsic 
moral costs are higher for stealing, while theoretical predictions and previous research 
would imply constant intrinsic costs for both types of immoral behavior. 
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Table 1: Proportion of fully honest decisions in self-reported outcome and theft tasks of 
past studies (cf. Rosenbaum et al., 2014) 
Study Type Sample 
Overall full 
honesty in % 
    
Gino and Wiltermuth (2014)  SRO 178 US citizens 76% 
Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) SRO 478 students 39% 
Kocher et al. (2018) SRO 273 students 59% - 69% 
Gneezy et al. (2018) SRO 916 students 67% - 74% 
Friesen and Gangadharan (2013) TT 115 students 67% 
Gino and Pierce (2009) TT 53 students 37% 
Shu and Gino (2012) TT 56 students 68% 
Gino and Wiltermuth (2014) TT 153 US citizens 41% 
    
Note: SRO = self-reported outcome; TT = theft task 
3. Experimental design 
In this section, we describe our experiment. First, the design allowing participants to lie is 
introduced. Second, we explain the changes made in the experiment in order to test for 
theft. Third, we provide insights into the experimental procedure. 
3.1 Die-rolling task 
The general design was based on the die-rolling task introduced by Kocher et al. (2018) 
which is an extension of the Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi (2013) task. Before the task 
was carried out, participants had to correctly answer control questions regarding the task to 
ensure their understanding (see appendix C.1). Afterwards, participants saw a video of a 
die roll on their respective computer screens. A classic six-sided die was rolled in the video 
leading to six possible outcomes:  or . By drawing a random number, the 
software determined which outcome was shown. Participants were informed that the out-
come of the die roll was determined by a random draw from six outcomes with an equal 
probability of occurrence. After the video played, the outcome of the die roll was visible 
on the participants’ screens for about 12 seconds. Subsequently, the participants’ task was 
to report the outcome of the die roll (‘Die number seen: ___’). Any possible outcome (1, 2, 
3, 4, 5 or 6) could be entered by the participants. Thus, participants had the possibility to 
report dishonestly. The reported number determined the payoff of the participant, while the 
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outcome of the die roll did not affect the payoff. We used a specific payoff structure for the 
die roll outcome (see Table 2). As in previous research, the highest payoff was associated 
with rolling a ‘5’ and the lowest payoff with rolling a ‘6’ (Fischbacher and Föllmi-Heusi, 
2013). Therefore, a payoff maximizer would always report the number associated with the 
highest payoff, i.e., ‘5’. 
Table 2: Payoff structure of die-rolling task 
Entered number Your payoff Residual 
‘1’ €2 €8 
‘2’ €4 €6 
‘3’ €6 €4 
‘4’ €8 €2 
‘5’ €10 €0 
‘6’ €0 €10 
 
As the participants were aware that the random number determining the outcome in the 
video was derived by the software, they could conclude that their lies were observed by the 
experimenter (Kocher et al., 2018).  
3.2 Treatments 
To answer our research questions, we implemented two treatments: Lying and Stealing. 
The general design of the die-rolling task described in the last section was used to observe 
Lying and was thus a replication of the Kocher et al. (2018) design. For the Stealing treat-
ment, the die-rolling task was also carried out in order to determine the participants’ pay-
offs and provide comparable framework conditions for both treatments. However, we then 
introduced specific modifications in the design to observe stealing: in the Stealing treat-
ment, the participants were responsible for the allocation of money. Therefore, the out-
come of the die-rolling task was not entered in the computer. Instead, each participant re-
ceived an envelope containing five €2 coins, i.e., €10. In accordance with their respective 
outcomes, participants were asked to allocate the money in the envelope by removing their 
payoff and leaving the residual. Afterwards, they were asked to close the envelope. It was 
obvious from the instructions of the Stealing treatment (appendix C.1) that the envelopes 
were not collected during the experiment. The closed envelopes were simply left behind at 
the respective cabins.
1
 In order to avoid any potential misleading with regard to the attribu-
                                                 
1
 At the end of the experiment, one experimenter paid participants the remaining payment and a second ex-
perimenter made sure no one took the envelopes from other cabins. 
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tion of envelopes to cabins after the experiment, we prepared our envelopes with specific 
signs on the corners which were only visible under UV-light (see appendix C.2). We pre-
pared each envelope with a specific sign combination associated with a particular cabin 
number. With this modification in the Stealing treatment, we let participants allocate the 
money in the envelope by themselves and therefore allowed theft. Table 3 illustrates the 
characteristics of both treatments. 
Table 3: Comparison of treatments 
 Treatment 
 Lying Stealing 
Control questions x x 
Die roll video x x 
Outcome of die roll  
suggests payoff 
x x 
Enter die-rolling outcome in computer x - 
Receive an envelope containing €10 - x 
 
3.3 Experimental procedure 
The experiment was conducted in autumn 2017 at the University of Göttingen. A total of 
80 participants (46.25% female) took part in the experiment, with 40 individuals randomly 
assigned to each treatment. The participants were recruited using ORSEE (Greiner, 2015) 
and the experiment was programmed in z-tree (Fischbacher, 2007).  
We favored a between-subject design for our treatment comparison for the following rea-
sons: i) In a within-subject design, we would not be able to randomize the payoff-relevant 
treatment for the individuals as in Kocher et al. (2018). In our case, we would have to hand 
over the envelope containing real money, which would disclose the payoff-relevant task 
within the experiment directly. ii) It would be possible to pay individuals for all treatments 
in a within-subject design; however, this would lead to order effects induced by wealth 
changes as well as compensation effects, which are difficult to control for, making the 
within-subject design pointless. iii) In a within-subject comparison, it would be favorable 
that framework conditions were equal, i.e., the two outcomes of the die-rolling tasks 
matched, but this contradicts the premise of a random draw. 
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At the beginning of the experiment, participants received written instructions (see appendix 
C.1) and were requested to raise their hands if questions arose. Questions were asked and 
answered in private. Afterwards, participants carried out the die-rolling task followed by 
additional experimental tasks. In addition to the die-rolling task, we measured protected 
values regarding honesty according to Gibson et al. (2013). This detailed questionnaire is 
available in appendix C.3. Afterwards, participants answered two short incentivized fair-
ness tasks which are not related to this paper. Subsequently, participants were asked to 
answer another short questionnaire. Finally, participants received their payoffs from the 
experimenter privately, which were composed of: i) a fee for showing up and ii) payoffs 
for the die-rolling task (Lying treatment only) and the additional tasks. 
4. Results 
In order to provide an overview of the participants’ decisions, we illustrate the reports and 
the associated outcomes for both treatments in Figure 1. The outcome is the number which 
was shown by the dice. The report is the number the participant entered in the computer in 
the Lying treatment. As participants in the Stealing treatment did not report directly, we 
counted the amount of money remaining in the envelope to determine the report.
2
 On the 
one hand, Figure 1 demonstrates that in the Lying treatment, a considerable share of partic-
ipants reported a higher pay-off than their outcomes indicated. Furthermore, most partici-
pants who lied reported a roll of ‘5’ instead of their true outcome. On the other hand, there 
were only a few participants in the Stealing treatment who took advantage of the oppor-
tunity to withdraw more money from the envelope than their outcome suggested. 
                                                 
2
 For simplicity, we also use the term ‘report’ for the Stealing treatment in the following. 
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Figure 1: Scatterplot with jitter for outcomes and reports in the two treatments (n per 
treatment = 40). 
Note: Reports in the stealing treatments were recorded based on the money removed from the envelope; 
honest reports fall along the main diagonal. 
 
In total, 30% of the participants lied while only 12.5% of participants stole. This difference 
is statistically significant according to a Chi² test
3
 (p = 0.056). Based on the different rela-
tive amounts of lying and stealing, we also calculated a measure for the relative additional 
payoff.
4
 Unsurprisingly, comparing the relative additional payoffs, we also found a statisti-
cally significant difference according to a Mann-Whitney test (p = 0.030). For Lying, the 
relative additional payoff was 0.288, while for Stealing it was only 0.080. 
Result 1: Stealing is less frequent than lying. 
Subsequent to the investigation of differences in the incidence of lying and stealing, we 
further analyzed whether this effect was justified by varying intrinsic costs between lying 
and stealing. To accomplish this, we measured the extent to which honesty is a protected 
value for participants according to Gibson et al. (2013). The lower the score of this protect-
ed value measure, the more easily participants will trade honesty for other goods. Thus, we 
expected a correlation between the protected value score and lying in the respective treat-
ment. Indeed, the correlation of protected values with the relative additional payoff was 
                                                 
3
 We used the Chi² test if possible and the Fisher’s exact test otherwise. 
4
 The relative additional payoff is defined as: (report-outcome) / (10 euros-outcome). Thus, it is restricted 
between 0 (a participant reporting the true outcome) and 1 (a participant with an outcome < 5 reporting a 
5). 
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highly significant for the Lying treatment (Spearman rank correlation = -0.462; p = 0.003). 
Surprisingly, this correlation was not significant for the Stealing treatment (Spearman rank 
correlation = -0.182; p = 0.261). Therefore, the score in the protected value measure can be 
used to predict lying but not stealing (for illustration, see Figure 2). The reason for the lack 
of a significant correlation for Stealing was revealed by participants with a low protected 
value measure (median split). We compared the relative additional payoff of these partici-
pants between treatments. Indeed, we found a significant decrease in immoral behavior of 
participants with a low protected values score in the Stealing treatment (p = 0.044; Mann-
Whitney test). Thus, participants who are willing to trade honesty as a moral value for oth-
er goods reveal less immoral behavior as they are faced with higher costs of immorality in 
the Stealing task. In contrast, those who regard honesty as a highly protected value were 
already acting according to their morale values in the Lying treatment, as their intrinsic 
costs for immoral behavior are generally high. 
 
Figure 2: Scatterplot with x-axis jitter for the protected value scores of honest and dishon-
est participants in the two treatments (n per treatment = 40). 
Note: Protected value score for honesty according to Gibson et al. (2013); possible values ranging from 0-6. 
 
Result 2: Moral values on honesty predict lying but not stealing. 
Result 3: Stealing is associated with higher intrinsic costs compared to lying. 
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Additionally, we investigated individual characteristics which explain the significant dif-
ference in immoral behavior we observed. An important characteristic of agents regarding 
their moral behavior is gender (Gylfason et al., 2013). The proportion of women and men 
showing immoral behavior in both treatments is shown in Table 4. Surprisingly, we did not 
find evidence for a gender effect in either treatment, i.e., gender does not predict lying or 
stealing. In both the Lying treatment (p = 1.000; Fisher’s exact test) and the Stealing treat-
ment (p = 0.345; Fisher’s exact test), women showed a rate of moral behavior that was not 
significantly different from that of men. These results also hold true for the amount of the 
additional payoff (p = 0.695, p = 0.229; Mann-Whitney tests). However, comparing the 
treatment effect for genders separately, we found that women’s behavior differed signifi-
cantly (p = 0.090; Fisher’s exact test) between the two treatments, but men’s behavior did 
not (p = 0.488; Fisher’s exact test). This result is also supported considering the relative 
additional payoff (women: p = 0.071, men: p = 0.167; Mann-Whitney tests). Thus, our 
treatment effect was driven by women who lie but avoid stealing. 
Table 4: Moral and immoral behavior in both treatments divided by gender 
 Lying  Stealing 
 Men (n = 22) Women (n = 18)  Men (n = 21) Women (n = 19) 
Honest 68.2% 72.2%  80.9% 94.7% 
Lie/Steal 31.8% 27.8%  19.1% 5.3% 
 
Result 4: There is no gender effect for the moral costs of lying or stealing. 
Result 5: Women steal less frequently than they lie. 
5. Conclusion and Discussion 
Lying and stealing are immoral actions disturbing social interactions and harming econom-
ic agents in various ways. We found a variation in the rate of immoral action between lying 
and stealing when all incentives and the risk of consequences from immoral actions were 
kept constant. Results suggest higher intrinsic costs associated with stealing compared to 
lying. Recent studies focus on self-justification as a main determinant of intrinsic costs of 
immoral behavior. We conclude, in line with these studies, that the authority receiving the 
immoral act provides participants with a potential self-justification. If someone is dishonest 
to someone else, the victim has the opportunity to convict the liar. This (possibly unrealis-
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tic) opportunity might be operationalized by liars to justify their immoral behavior. How-
ever, removing this authority leaves agents with less self-justification and increases their 
intrinsic costs of immoral behavior. 
Focusing on the extent of lying in our experiment, the results are comparable to other stud-
ies using a die-rolling task with observable outcomes. Kocher et al. (2018) reported 
between 31% and 41% of participants lying under the same experimental conditions. 
Comparable results were also obtained by Gneezy et al. (2018), who did not use die-
rolling, but rather a related task with observable outcomes. They found dishonesty levels 
between 26% and 33%. In contrast, for a theft task, different levels of stealing were report-
ed. The proportion of thefts in our sample was more comparable to those elicited by 
Gravert (2013) with a similar design, i.e. randomly determined outcomes. However, the 
rate of theft in the studies applying the task of Mazar et al. (2008) was higher, ranging 
between 30% and 60% (Friesen and Gangadharan, 2013; Gino and Pierce, 2009; Shu and 
Gino, 2012). Gravert (2013) provided evidence for this difference, namely that the effort 
made in the classical theft task seems to be responsible for the higher levels of theft.  
A further comparison of our results can be made regarding the gender difference in lying 
and stealing. As we did not find evidence for a statistically significant gender difference 
for the amount of lying, we contradict findings of other researchers (Fosgaard et al., 2013; 
Grosch and Rau, 2017; Houser et al., 2012; Kajackaite and Gneezy, 2017). Nevertheless, 
the gender difference in honesty is a matter of discussion, as there are also studies that re-
jected the hypothesis of gender differences (Childs, 2012; Gylfason et al., 2013; Kajackaite 
and Gneezy, 2017). Our results support the latter studies; however, the tendency of the 
gender difference we observed was in line with predictions. In contrast, previous studies on 
stealing indicate a weak gender difference in stealing (Friesen and Gangadharan, 2013; 
Gravert, 2013). Indeed, our results tend in the direction that women steal less than men; 
however, they support the weak correlation found in the literature. Consequently, we con-
tribute to the insights about gender differences regarding intrinsic costs of immoral behav-
ior by finding evidence that women have more difficulty self-justifying stealing compared 
to lying.  
The results obtained in this study could be used as a starting point for future investigations 
regarding moral costs of lying and stealing. It might be a worthwhile approach to apply our 
comparison of lying and stealing to the theft task of Mazar et al. (2008). Since Gravert 
(2013) reported that stealing varies from a die-rolling task to an effort task where stealing 
is possible, it might be feasible to investigate whether the different moral costs of lying and 
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stealing are maintained in an effort-based framework. Furthermore, framework conditions 
for decision problems could be stylized to reflect applied decision situations which allow 
for immoral behavior. For instance, an interesting context could be a tax avoidance fram-
ing where participants have to report income and costs (lying) or have to pay the respective 
tax on their own (stealing). It could also be helpful to investigate the association of effort 
and intrinsic costs as well as moral compensation for lying and stealing in more detail. 
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VII Conclusion 
In this section, the main findings and implications of the studies composing this thesis are 
presented. The structure of the conclusion follows the previous organization by addressing 
the respective articles consecutively. 
 
The first part of the thesis focuses on various aspects of the disposition effect in the 
boarder and stricter sense. In Chapter II, entitled ‘The disposition effect when deciding 
on behalf of others’, we compared the disposition effect for private investments and in-
vestments on behalf of others. The results reveal stronger disposition effects when inves-
tors’ trading decisions affect the payoff of other subjects rather than their own payoffs. 
More concretely, inexperienced traders with a prosocial attitude more readily sell capital 
gains when making decisions for others than for themselves. By contrast, no treatment ef-
fect could be found for individualistic subjects and decision-makers with a high degree of 
trading experience. These results are exciting, as we can conclude that even intrinsic mo-
tives are sufficient to cause pronounced disposition effects when deciding for others. It is 
worth considering that social distance might be reduced if an investor decides on behalf of 
a person she knows; hence, it is likely that the effects are more pronounced when investors 
decide for their friends. Our findings have practical implications for everyday trading—
i.e., private investors who consider delegating their investment decisions to friends should 
be cautious, as prosocial investors with a low degree of trading experience exhibit pro-
nounced disposition effects. Furthermore, we found that deciding on behalf of others abol-
ishes the correlation of individual loss aversion and the disposition effect (Andersson et al., 
2014). We additionally tested for the motivation of investors under both conditions. How-
ever, we found no evidence that inexperienced investors were less motivated when decid-
ing on behalf of others—i.e., no differences in trading volume or between the precision of 
guess scores regarding the performance of shares were found for the two treatments.  
In Chapter III, entitled ‘Determinants of financial loss aversion: The influence of pre-
natal androgen exposure (2D:4D)’, I investigated the influence of prenatal androgen ex-
posure on financial loss aversion as a key driver of the disposition effect. The results pro-
vide evidence that increased prenatal testosterone exposure reduces loss aversion. Thus, 
the results of this study contribute by providing a detailed picture of the connection be-
tween biological factors and (behavioral) economics preferences, i.e., loss aversion. 
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Awareness of this relationship could improve the economic performance of agents with 
low prenatal testosterone exposure. For instance, they could consider setting ex-ante stop 
loss rules in order to reduce the occurrence of the disposition effect (Fischbacher et al., 
2017) in the case of stock trading. Besides the relationship with the right-hand digit ratio, 
loss aversion was negatively associated with a greater number of siblings and better math 
grades. Thus, it could be concluded that the intensity of competition during childhood and 
mathematical education can reduce the importance of loss aversion in determining eco-
nomic behavior. The results also revealed that females have greater loss aversion than 
males. However, prenatal testosterone exposure, siblings and better mathematical skills are 
possible factors that can counteract the greater loss aversion of females compared to males.  
In the last chapter (IV) of the first part, entitled ‘The disposition effect in farmers’ selling 
behavior – An experimental investigation’, we analyzed the disposition effect in disin-
vestment decisions for commodity stocks. We applied an experimental setting to a sample 
of farmers. Our results show a robust disposition effect in farmers’ selling decisions. We 
measured disposition effects with two different experimental designs. In both of them, par-
ticipants revealed disposition effect behavior to a comparable extent. In addition, we inves-
tigated Prospect Theory parameters as potential determinants of the disposition effect. Sur-
prisingly, the level of risk aversion does not affect the trading bias. However, we found 
that probability weighting and loss aversion are drivers of the disposition effect. A surpris-
ing result is that loss aversion was positively related to the proportion of gains realized, but 
not the proportion of realized losses. The results have implications for farmers and consult-
ants of farm enterprises. As the losses associated with acting according to the disposition 
effect are substantial, farmers who are able to reduce this behavior might have an ad-
vantage in competition with others. While our results reveal that education is not a factor 
reducing occurrence of the disposition effect, experience is relevant. Thus, it might be a 
worthwhile approach for seasoned commodity sellers to share their experiences with inex-
perienced agents. 
 
In the second part of this thesis, the focus of the investigations was immoral behavior. In 
chapter V, entitled ‘Be close to me and I will be honest: How social distance influences 
honesty’, we studied the consequences of different levels of social distance for honesty. 
We found reduced lying as social distance decreases. Specifically, participants were less 
willing to lie at the expense of fellow students than at the expense of the experimenter. We 
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did not find that outcome inequality mediated the effect of social distance on honesty. That 
said, we found that participants lied more readily to increase their payoff when it was less 
than half of the available money, and they never lied to benefit others, irrespective of social 
distance. Hence, we observed what Erat and Gneezy (2012) call selfish ‘black lies’ but not 
altruistic ‘white lies.’ Beyond these results, additional analyses revealed that social distance 
did not matter to participants who tended to consider honesty a protected value which they 
would not trade for other values. Social distance only mattered among those participants 
who were inclined to trade honesty for other values and who therefore responded to the 
different situations that arose from our manipulation. Likewise, the effect of social distance 
depended on participants’ aversion to favorable inequality. Only participants who were 
sufficiently uneasy with inequality which favored themselves over others changed their 
behavior according to the circumstances. Our findings have implications for the design of 
social interactions. In particular, there are many interactions that require honesty to a cer-
tain extent but involve social distance. Measures to decrease social distance might be a 
worthwhile alternative to costly control efforts, which are a common response to dishones-
ty. Our findings are also relevant in the context of intermediaries, which are often used in 
social interactions, such as transactions between firms. Although there are compelling rea-
sons to rely on intermediaries, they also increase social distance and create room for dis-
honesty (Erat, 2013). 
In the last chapter (VI) of this thesis, entitled ‘I might be a liar, but not a thief: An ex-
perimental distinction between the moral costs of lying and stealing’, different moral 
costs of lying and stealing were analyzed. We found a variation in the rate of immoral ac-
tion between lying and stealing. Results suggest higher intrinsic costs associated with steal-
ing compared to lying. Recent studies have focused on self-justification as a main determi-
nant of the intrinsic costs of immoral behavior. We conclude, in line with these studies, 
that the authority receiving the immoral act provides participants with a potential self-
justification. If someone is dishonest to someone else, the victim has the opportunity to 
convict the liar. This opportunity might be operationalized by liars to justify their immoral 
behavior. However, removing this authority leaves agents with less self-justification and 
increases their intrinsic costs of immoral behavior. We did not find evidence for a gender 
difference regarding the amount of lying or stealing. However, we contribute to the in-
sights about gender differences regarding intrinsic costs of immoral behavior by providing 
evidence that women have more difficulty self-justifying stealing compared to lying. As 
VII Conclusion 
80 
 
stealing is associated with higher intrinsic costs for economic agents, it might be possible 
to reduce economic losses by reframing decisions in various contexts. For instance, the 
transfer of responsibility to agents under conditions of asymmetric information and conse-
quently the changed perception of the immoral action might increase behavior which is in 
accordance with moral convictions. 
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Appendix A 
A.1 Eckel and Grossman task 
In this part you have to choose one of 9 lotteries which you prefer most. After your deci-
sion the computer will perform your selected lottery. Both payoffs arise with a probability 
of 50%. At the end of the experiment you will be informed of the outcome of the draw. 
 
Table A.1: Conducted EG-task 
Lottery 
Expected  
value of the 
lottery
a) 
Payoff A 
probability 
50% 
Payoff B 
probability 
50% 
Please choose 
your pre-
ferred lottery 
Range of con-
stant relative risk 
aversion if choos-
ing this lottery
b) 
1 €2.00 €2.00 €2.00 ○ 1.37 ≤ r ≤ ∞ 
2 €2.08 €2.56 €1.59 ○ 0.97 < r ≤ 1.37 
3 €2.26 €3.28 €1.24 ○ 0.68 < r ≤ 0.97 
4 €2.46 €4.00 €0.92 ○ 0.41 < r ≤ 0.68 
5 €2.55 €4.35 €0.74 ○ 0.15 < r ≤ 0.41 
6 €2.58 €4.59 €0.57 ○ -0.15 < r ≤ 0.15 
7 €2.57 €4.65 €0.48 ○ -0.49 < r ≤ -0.15 
8 €2.55 €4.67 €0.42 ○ -0.95 < r ≤ -0.49 
9 €2.45 €4.68 €0.22 ○ - ∞ ≤ r ≤ -0.95 
a)
 
Column was shown in the modified version. 
b) Column was not shown. A power utility function of the form 𝑈(𝑥) =
𝑥(1−𝑟)
1−𝑟
 is assumed (Eckel and 
Grossman, 2008).  
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A.2 Gächter et al. task 
You receive an endowment of 70 cents for this part. In the following you are faced with 10 
lotteries. Assume that for each of the 10 questions a coin is thrown. The coin can either 
land at ‘heads’ or ‘tail.’ To answer each of the 10 questions you will either have to choose 
‘accept’ or ‘reject’ taking part in the respective lottery. After you submit your decisions the 
computer will randomly draw one of the lotteries. If you reject this specific lottery you will 
receive the endowment after the experiment. If you accept the randomly chosen lottery the 
computer will flip a coin and the outcome of this coin toss will be added to your endow-
ment. At the end of the experiment you will be informed of the randomly selected lottery 
and the outcome of the draw. 
 
Table A.2: Conducted GJH-task 
Lottery Accept Reject
 
Range of loss 
aversion coeffi-
cient (λ) if 
switching to 
reject in this row
a) 
1 
If the coin turns up heads, then you lose 12 cents; 
if the coin turns up tails, you win 60 cents. 
( ) ( ) 5.00 ≤ λ ≤ ∞ 
2 
If the coin turns up heads, then you lose 15 cents; 
if the coin turns up tails, you win 60 cents 
( ) ( ) 4.00 ≤ λ ≤ 5.00  
3 
If the coin turns up heads, then you lose 20 cent; 
if the coin turns up tails, you win 60 cents 
( ) ( ) 3.00 ≤ λ ≤ 4.00 
4 
If the coin turns up heads, then you lose 25 cents; 
if the coin turns up tails, you win 60 cents. 
( ) ( ) 2.40 ≤ λ ≤ 3.00 
5 
If the coin turns up heads, then you lose 30 cents; 
if the coin turns up tails, you win 60 cents. 
( ) ( ) 2.00 ≤ λ ≤ 2.40 
6 
If the coin turns up heads, then you lose 35 cents; 
if the coin turns up tails, you win 60 cents. 
( ) ( ) 1.71 ≤ λ ≤ 2.00 
7 
If the coin turns up heads, then you lose 40 cents; 
if the coin turns up tails, you win 60 cents. 
( ) ( ) 1.50 ≤ λ ≤ 1.71 
8 
If the coin turns up heads, then you lose 50 cents; 
if the coin turns up tails, you win 60 cents. 
( ) ( ) 1.20 ≤ λ ≤ 1.50 
9 
If the coin turns up heads, then you lose 60 cents; 
if the coin turns up tails, you win 60 cents. 
( ) ( ) 1.00 ≤ λ ≤ 1.20 
10 
If the coin turns up heads, then you lose 70 cents; 
if the coin turns up tails, you win 60 cents. 
( ) ( ) 0.86 ≤ λ ≤ 1.00 
a) Column was not shown. As in Gächter et al. (2007), equal curvature parameters in the gain and the loss 
domain are assumed for deriving λ. 
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A.3 SVO slider measure 
 
Figure A.3: SVO Sliders that were presented gradually to the participants. Values are by a 
conversion factor of 100 token = 2 €.  
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A.4 Questionnaire for measuring empathy 
You will now read several statements which describe specific (generalized) human atti-
tudes or reactions. All of them are associated with emotions. Please mark on the 5-point-
scale to what extent they apply to you. Higher numbers indicate greater agreement. Per-
haps you remember a specific incident for the specific statements. There is no right or 
wrong.  
 
Answer scale: 
 Never Rarely Sometimes Frequently Always 
Statement # 1-16 ○ ○ ○ ○ ○ 
 
Statements: 
1. I often have tender, concerned feelings for people less fortunate than me. (EC)  
2. I really get involved with the feelings of the characters in a novel. (FS)  
3. In emergency situations, I feel apprehensive and ill-at-ease. (PD)  
4. I try to look at everybody’s side of a disagreement before I make a decision. (PT)  
5. When I see someone being taken advantage of, I feel kind of protective toward them. 
(EC)  
6. I sometimes feel helpless when I am in the middle of a very emotional situation. (PD)  
7. After seeing a play or movie, I sometimes feel as though I were one of the characters. 
(FS) 
8. Being in a tense emotional situation scares me. (PD)  
9. I am often quite touched by things that I see happen. (EC)  
10. I believe that there are two sides to every question and I try to look at them both. (PT)  
11. I would describe myself as a pretty soft-hearted person. (EC)  
12. When I watch a good movie, I can very easily put myself in the place of a leading 
character. (FS)  
13. I tend to lose control during emergencies. (PD)  
14. When I’m upset at someone, I usually try to ‘put myself in his shoes’ for a while. (PT)  
15. When I am reading an interesting story or novel, I imagine how I would feel if the 
events in the story were happening to me. (FS)  
16. Before criticizing somebody, I try to imagine how I would feel if I were in their place. 
(PT) 
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A.5 Questionnaire for measuring socio demographics and trade experience 
Please answer the following questions. Afterwards we will give out the payments. 
[…] 
 
How do you assess your personal experience in the trading of stocks? Please answer on the 
following scale from 1–10 (where 1 = no experience in trading and 10 = very extensive 
experience in stock trading) 
 
( ) 1    ….     ( ) 10 
[…] 
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Table A.6: Tobit regressions with robust standard errors on DE, PGR, PLR and Alpha for subsample of experienced traders
a) 
 DE  PGR  PLR  Alpha 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4)  (5) (6)  (7) (8) 
            
Constant -0.204
**
 0.286  0.099 0.005  0.3030
***
 -0.274  0.025 0.083 
Responsibility (1=yes) 0.020
 
-  0.024
 
-  -0.001
 
-  0.000
 
- 
Prosocial
b)
(1=yes) -0.043 -  -0.053 -  -0.001 -  -0.237 - 
Individual x Prosocial - baseline  - baseline  - baseline  - baseline 
Individual x Individualistic - -0.011  - -0.012  - -0.013  - 0.325 
Responsibility x Prosocial - -0.047  - -0.004  - 0.032  - 0.101 
Responsibility x Individualistic - -0.006  - 0.075  - 0.076  - 0.151 
Loss aversion (lambda)
c)
 0.130
***
 0.102
***
  0.031 0.026  -0.104
***
 -0.083
**
  0.124 0.045 
Risk aversion (CRRA)
d)
 -0.048 -0.080
**
  -0.015 -0.034  0.035
*
 0.050
**
  -0.069 -0.103 
Female (1=yes) - 0.195
***
  - 0.030  - -0.171
***
  - 0.277 
Pride
e)
 - 0.021  - 0.023
**
  - 0.002  - 0.025 
Regret
f)
 - -0.006  - 0.003  - 0.007  - 0.020 
Empathy
g)
 - -0.014  - -0.003  - 0.012
*
  - -0.017 
Math grade (1–15)h) - -0.011  - -0.006  - 0.003  - 0.002 
Study economics(1=yes) - 0.119
*
  - 0.122
**
  - -0.002  - 0.282 
            
σi) 0.231 0.206  0.158 0.146  0.174 0.154  0.659 0.619 
Observations 69 69  69 69  69 69  69 69 
Note: Nine participants show inconsistent choices (switching back and forth between accepting and rejecting lotteries) in the GJH task and are therefore omitted for the regression 
estimates. However, most results are qualitatively identical if we estimate the models without lambda (Study economics is not significant in model (2) if lambda is not taken into 
account and therefore n = 78). Level of significance: *** p <0.01, ** p <0.05, * p <0.10 
a) According to a specific question with possible values ranging from 0 (no experience) and 10 (highly experienced). b) According to an incentivized Murphy task, possible val-
ues ranging from -16.26° to 61.39°. c) According to an incentivized GJH task, possible values ranging from 0.68 to 5.50. d) According to a modified and incentivized EG task, 
possible values ranging from -1.60 to 1.81. e) According to a specific question with possible values ranging from 0 (not proud at all) and 10 (very proud). f) According to a spe-
cific question with possible values ranging from 0 (no regret) and 10 (very much regret). g) According to the IRI based Saarbrücker personality questionnaire, possible values 
ranging from 12 to 60. h) Possible values ranging from 0 to 15; 15 is the best grade. i) The sigma (σ) value represents the estimated standard error of the interval regressions. 
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A.7 Experimental Instructions: Responsibility treatment  
[Translation from German] 
Welcome to this experiment about decision theory and thank you very much for you partic-
ipation. Please read these instructions to the experiment carefully.  
At the beginning of the experiment, every participant will receive a note containing a neu-
tral letter (e.g. ‘B’ or ‘U). These letters are assigned randomly and the alphabetic order is 
not linked to the numbers of the cabins. 
Due to the following part of the experiment you will decide for someone else. The other 
participant is randomly assigned to you by the computer. This other participant will remain 
anonymous during and after the experiment. The only information available to you is the 
randomly assigned letter. Furthermore, you are assigned to another participant who decides 
for you.  
Note: The participant who decides for you is not the same as the participant you are decid-
ing for. 
For the main experiment: 
 Your decisions do not have any consequences for your payoff. However, your deci-
sions have direct consequences for the payoff of the randomly assigned partici-
pants. 
 Your payoff depends on the decisions of the randomly assigned participant. This 
participant decides for you and is not the participant you are deciding for. 
Before the experiment starts you are informed about the anonymous name (letter) of the 
participant you are deciding for. Moreover, you are informed about the name (letter) of the 
participant who decides for you. 
During the experiment you will earn Talers which are converted to € by the following ex-
change-rate 
1,000 Talers = €1 
at the end of the experiment. The assigned participant whose payoff depend on your deci-
sions will receive your Taler earnings converted in € and you receive the € amount the oth-
er participant earned for you. You will be informed about the earnings of the assigned par-
ticipant at the end of the experiment before you are paid. 
After the experiment, please wait at your desk until we will ask you to come to get your 
payoff. The payment is anonymous. Thus you will not get information about payments of 
other participants or their assigned letter. Please notice that it is not allowed to talk. If you 
will talk to other persons the experiment will be finished immediately. If you have a ques-
tion, please raise your hand. We will come to your desk to answer it individually. 
 
Description of the experiment 
The experiment consists of 14 periods. In every period you have the possibility to buy 
shares of the firms A, B, C, D, E, and F. Every share has a certain value in Talers in every 
period. 
You start the experiment with an endowment of 10,000 Talers. 
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Performance of shares 
The shares A-F will change in prices at the beginning of each of the 14 periods, i.e., in the 
subsequent period there will be no share which will have the same price as in the previous 
period. The share price changes have been predetermined before the experiment started. 
That is, all price changes of all shares are completely independent of all your buying and 
selling decisions. The same is true for all buying and selling decisions of the other partici-
pants of the experiment. Each of the shares A-F is of a certain type. The share types differ 
regarding their probability of increasing (decreasing) in value at the beginning of the peri-
od. The distributions of the types are given in the table below. In the experiment there will 
be exactly one share (of the shares A-F) which follows type ‘++’ and the same is true for 
one share of type ‘+’, ‘–‘, and ‘– –‘. There will be two types (of the shares A-F) which fol-
low type ‘0’. All types are displayed at the below table. 
 
Shares in the market Type Probability of price 
increase 
Probability of price 
decrease 
1 ++ 65% 35% 
1 + 65% 45% 
2 0 50% 50% 
1 – 45% 55% 
1 – – 35% 65% 
Example: 
 assume that share X is of type: ‘++’ 
 at the beginning of each period the probability of a price increase of X is: 65% 
 at the beginning of each period the probability of a price decrease of X is: 35% 
 
The share price is determined as follows: 
1. At the beginning of each period a share either increases (decreases). The probabil-
ity depends on the share's type (see table). 
2. Afterwards the magnitude of the price change (increase/ decrease) will be deter-
mined. The magnitude of the price change can either be of 1, 3 or 5 Talers. Every 
magnitude (1, 3 or 5 Talers) can happen with the same probability. That is, every 
magnitude (1, 3 or 5 Talers) can happen with a probability of one-third. This is the 
same for every share, independent of its type. 
 
Buying and selling actions of shares 
In each of the 14 periods you have the possibility to buy and sell shares for the portfolio of 
the other participant. You will find a screen shot at the next page which depicts all of your 
decision possibilities in the course of the experiment. In the upper part you will find the 
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share price window, displaying shares A-F. The price changes of shares A-F in periods 1-
14 will be displayed here. To give you an idea of shares' past price changes, you will also 
find the prices of periods -3, -2, -1 and 0. In the following you are given an overview of the 
price changes of the shares A-F in the periods -3, -2, -1 and 0. 
 
Possibilities of decisions in the experiment 
The upper part of the window is the share price window: 
 The array labeled ‘price’ displays the exact price of a share in the current period. 
For instance, in the screen shot share A had a price of 76 Talers in period -3. 
 Furthermore, the array ‘Bought/sold’ displays the number of bought/sold shares in 
the current period. The screen uses the following symbols: ‘– –‘ which means that 
there was no transaction. ‘1’ which means that one share was bought. ‘–1’ which 
means that one share was sold. 
The window at the bottom is the transaction window. Here, you can decide in each period 
whether you would like to buy/sell one or more shares of shares A-F. 
 The array ‘number owned’ displays the current number of shares owned 
 The array ‘current price’ depicts the price which has to be paid in order to buy new 
shares. At the same time you would receive this price for each share sold. 
 The array ‘endowment’ displays your endowment. 
If you decide to buy shares of a firm then you have to pay for each share its current price. 
The sum of your expenditures cannot exceed your actual endowment. 
Example: 
 Share A's current price in period 1 is 110 Talers. You decide to buy five shares of 
A. 
Share A Price 
Bought/sold Share price window 
Transaction 
window 
Current price Buy/sell 1/5 share(s) Number owned 
You decide for participant:  X 
Endowment 
Continue 
Current period 
Periodical prices 
of shares A-F 
Period 
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 The expenditures for this transaction are given by: 5 * 110 Talers = 550 Talers and 
are immediately subtracted of your endowment 
To buy one unit of a share you can use the button ‘Buy 1 unit’. If you intend to buy 3 units 
you have to push the button ‘Buy 1 unit’ three times, etc. If you want to buy five units you 
can push the button ‘Buy 5 units’ instead of push the button ‘Buy 1 unit’ five times. 
If you already own some shares at the beginning of a period, then you have the possibility 
to sell these shares. You will receive the current price of each share which is sold added to 
you endowment. Selling shares follow the same principles as buying shares. However, the 
numbers of sold shares cannot exceed the total number of shares owned. 
Example: 
 Share C's current price in period 5 is 90 Talers. Assume, you own a total of four 
shares C and decide to sell 3 shares C. 
 This will lead to a payoff of: 3 * 90 Talers = 270 Talers. This amount will be di-
rectly credited to your endowment. Afterwards you will still own one share of C. 
To sell one unit of a share you can use the button ‘Sell 1 unit’. If you intend to sell 3 units 
you have to push the button ‘Sell 1 unit’ three times, etc. If you want to sell five units you 
can push the button ‘Sell 5 units’ instead of push the button ‘sell 1 unit’ five times. 
The experiment ends after 14 periods. Then you and your matched participant do not have 
the possibility to buy or sell shares. Afterwards, all shares that you own at this point in 
time are automatically liquidated. The resulting money amount will automatically credited 
to your endowment. 
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Additional earnings and payoff 
 
Additional earning 
Before the main experiment begins, you have the possibility to earn additional money by 
carrying out three tasks. The instructions for the tasks are displayed on the computer screen 
respectively. 
After the three tasks are carried out the main experiment starts (instructions in written 
form). 
Due to the main experiment, after the end of period 7 and 14, you have to guess which 
stock A-F followed the types:’++’, ‘+’, ‘0’, ‘– –‘and ‘–‘. You will be credited 200 Talers to 
your endowment for every correct guess. 
Payoff 
The total payoff you will earn in the experiment is calculated as follows: 
Total payoff = endowment which was not invested by the participant who decides for 
you + value of the shares in the portfolio of this participant + earnings of your guesses +  
your earnings from the three additional tasks. 
The total payoff of the participant on behalf of which you are deciding will earn in the ex-
periment: 
Total payoff = your endowment which was not invested + value of the shares in your port-
folio + earnings of this participants guesses + earnings of this participant from the three 
additional tasks. 
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Appendix B 
B.1 Instructions for the experiment (Low Degree of Social Distance condition) 
 
The following instructions were distributed in print. The task was completed on the com-
puter. 
General instructions 
Welcome to today’s experiment. 
Please keep quiet throughout the experiment and follow the experimenter’s instruc-
tions. Please don’t talk unless asked to talk. 
If you have any questions, raise your hand. The experimenter will come to you and 
answer your questions confidentially. Please turn off your mobile devices and stow them. 
Participants who fail to comply with these instructions will have to leave the room 
and will only be paid €2. 
Task 
While entering the lab, all participants were randomly assigned to one of two rooms. There 
is the same number of participants in each room. 
Every participant in this room will see a video which shows a six-sided die being 
rolled. Each outcome (, , , , , and ) is equally likely to occur. 
The die is rolled for each participant independently of the others. That is, the die is 
not rolled once for all participants, but for each participant individually. 
You must remember the outcome of your throw and enter it subsequently into a 
field on your computer screen. 
The number that you enter determines your share of the €10. This share is your 
compensation for this experiment. 
Number  
entered 
Your share Remainder 
‘1’ 02 € 08 € 
‘2’ 04 € 06 € 
‘3’ 06 € 04 € 
‘4’ 08 € 02 € 
‘5’ 10 € 00 € 
‘6’ 00 € 10 € 
A participant in the other room will be randomly assigned to you. This participant 
receives the remainder of the €10 as compensation. 
You won’t meet the other participant. You won’t learn this person’s identity and the 
other participant won’t learn your identity. 
Payment 
After the experiment, you will answer a number of questions. Your answers can earn you 
additional money. 
You will receive your compensation at the end of the experiment in return for your 
numbered badge. In addition to your compensation from the task, you’ll receive a fixed €4 
payment. 
You will be paid confidentially. Participants will be called out individually to go in-
to the reception room. 
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B.2 Instructions for the experiment (High Degree of Social Distance condition) 
 
The instructions for the High Degree of Social Distance condition were identical to those 
for the Low Degree of Social Distance condition except for the section ‘Task,’ which read 
as follows. 
Task 
Every participant in this room will see a video which shows a six-sided die being rolled. 
Each outcome (, , , , , and ) is equally likely to occur. 
The die is rolled for each participant independently of the others. That is, the die is 
not rolled once for all participants, but for each participant individually. 
You must remember the outcome of your throw and enter it subsequently into a 
field on your computer screen. 
The number that you enter determines your share of €10. This share is your com-
pensation from this experiment. 
Number  
entered 
Your share Remainder 
‘1’ 02 € 08 € 
‘2’ 04 € 06 € 
‘3’ 06 € 04 € 
‘4’ 08 € 02 € 
‘5’ 10 € 00 € 
‘6’ 00 € 10 € 
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B.3 Comprehension questions 
 
Participants cannot proceed until they have answered 1 – a, 2 – 6, 3 – 4, and 4 – 8. 
1. What’s your task? 
a. To enter the displayed number that you have memorized 
b. To enter a different number than the displayed number that you have memorized 
c. To enter an arbitrary number 
2. Suppose you see a  and you enter a ‘3.’ How many euros do you earn? 
___ 
3. Suppose you see a  and you enter a ‘2.’ How many euros do you earn? 
___ 
4. Suppose you see a  and you enter a ‘4.’ How many euros do you earn? 
___ 
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B.4 Measurement of the compassion parameter 
 
The multiple price list task to measure the compassion parameter β was adopted from 
Blanco et al. (2011). Participants were provided with a list of 22 choices, each between two 
allocations of payoffs between themselves and another participant (‘left’ and ‘right’). 
First, all participants made 22 decisions in the role of Person A. Half of the partici-
pants were then randomly assigned to be Person B and type-A and type-B participants were 
matched. Finally, one of the 22 choices of the type-A participant was randomly selected 
and implemented. 
Table E.4: Beta elicitation task 
Person A’s 
Payoff 
Person B’s 
Payoff Decision 
Person A’s Payoff Person B’s Payoff 
20 0 Left—Right 0 0 
20 0 Left—Right 1 1 
20 0 Left—Right 2 2 
20 0 Left—Right 3 3 
20 0 Left—Right 4 4 
20 0 Left—Right 5 5 
20 0 Left—Right 6 6 
20 0 Left—Right 7 7 
20 0 Left—Right 8 8 
20 0 Left—Right 9 9 
20 0 Left—Right 10 10 
20 0 Left—Right 11 11 
20 0 Left—Right 12 12 
20 0 Left—Right 13 13 
20 0 Left—Right 14 14 
20 0 Left—Right 15 15 
20 0 Left—Right 16 16 
20 0 Left—Right 17 17 
20 0 Left—Right 18 18 
20 0 Left—Right 19 19 
20 0 Left—Right 20 20 
20 0 Left—Right 21 21 
Note. The payoff is illustrated in units of ‘thaler.’ Each ‘thaler’ in the experimental task was remunerated with 
€0.15 at the end of the experiment. 
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B.5 Protected Values question 
 
What is your opinion on lying for one’s own benefit? 
I find this … 
Not at all praiseworthy 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 very praiseworthy 
Not at all shameful 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 very shameful 
Not at all acceptable 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 very acceptable 
Not at all outrageous 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 very outrageous 
Not at all blameworthy 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 very blameworthy 
Very immoral 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 very moral 
Honesty is something … 
… that one should not sacrifice, no matter what the (material or other) benefits. 
Strongly disagree 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 strongly agree 
… that cannot be measured in monetary terms. 
Strongly disagree 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 strongly agree 
… for which I think it is right to make a cost–benefit analysis. 
Strongly disagree 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 strongly agree 
… about which I can be flexible if the situation demands it. 
Strongly disagree 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 strongly agree 
… which is about things or values that are sacrosanct. 
Strongly disagree 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 strongly agree 
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B.6 Regressions results 
Table B.6.1: Effect of social distance on honesty 
 Relative additional payoff
a)
  Liar
b)
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
High Degree of Social Distance 1.029
***
 1.462
**
  1.013
**
 1.502
**
 
Outcome
c) 
 −.422**   −.460** 
Protected value score
d) 
 −.773***   −.860*** 
Compassion
e)
  −2.535**   −2.536** 
Age  .003   −.010 
Female  −.545   −.484 
Income  .000   .000 
Number of siblings
 
 .334   .331 
Math grade
f)
  .024   .013 
Constant −2.142** 1.884  −2.024*** 2.825 
Observations 120  120 
Note: The table reports coefficients of GLM and logit regressions of relative additional payoff and liar on the 
degree of social distance; * p < 0.10; ** p < 0.05; *** p < 0.01. 
a) (Report − Outcome) ÷ (5 – Outcome) if Outcome ≠ 5; 0 otherwise. 
b) 1 if Report ≠ Outcome; 0 otherwise. 
c) Outcome of the die roll; possible values ranging from 0 to 6 (where  corresponds to ‘0’; , to ‘1’; …; , 
to ‘5’ under truthful reporting). 
d) Protected value score for honesty according to Gibson et al. (2013); possible values ranging from 0 to 6. 
e) Compassion β according to Blanco et al. (2011); possible values ranging from −.075 to 1. 
f) Possible values ranging from 0 to 15, where 15 is best. 
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Table B.6.2: Effect of social distance and social preferences on honesty 
Panel A: Effects of social distance, compassion, and protected values score on honesty 
 Relative additional payoff
a)
  Liar
b)
 
 (1) (2)  (3) (4) 
HD
c)–HPd)–HCe) −.090 −.133  −.811 −1.716 
HD
c)–LPd)–HCe) .224 .188  1.030 .927 
HD
c)–HPd)–LCe) −.143 −.214  −1.368 −2.220* 
HD
c)–LPd)–LCe) .170 .174  .778 .994 
LD
c)–HPd)–HCe) −.155 −.186  −1.535 −2.191* 
LD
c)–LPd)–HCe) −.226* −.218*  f—f) f—f) 
LD
c)–HPd)–LCe) −.143 −.232*  −1.368 −2.313 
LD
c)–LPd)–LCe) g—g) g—g)  g—g) g—g) 
Outcome
h) 
 −.052**   −.548** 
Age  .003   .023 
Female  −.072   −.548 
Income  .000   .000 
Number siblings
 
 .037   .339 
Math grade
i)
  .006   .069 
Constant .226 .232  −1.030 −1.169 
Observations 120  120 
Panel B: Wald tests for differences (F-statistics in parentheses) 
 HD
c)–HPd)–HCe) HDc)–LPd)–HCe) HDc)–HPd)–LCe) LDc)–LPd)–LCe) 
LD
c)–HPd)–HCe) 
.659 
(0.20) 
   
LD
c)–LPd)–HCe)  
.005 
(8.16) 
  
LD
c)–HPd)–LCe)   
.900 
(0.02) 
 
LD
c)–LPd)–LCe)    
.152 
(2.08) 
 
Note: Panel A table reports coefficients of GLM and logit regressions of relative additional payoff and liar 
on the degree of social distance. Panel B reports the p-values and, in parenthesis, F-statistics, of Wald tests 
for differences between subgroups under a high and low degree of social distance for Model 2 in Panel A; 
*
 p < 0.10; 
**
 p < 0.05; 
***
 p < 0.01. 
a) (Report − Outcome) ÷ (5 – Outcome) if Outcome ≠ 5; 0 otherwise. 
b) 1 if Report ≠ Outcome; 0 otherwise. 
c) HD versus LD: High versus Low Degree of Social Distance. 
d) HP versus LP: High versus Low Protected Values Score for Honesty. 
e) HC versus LC: High versus Low Compassion β. 
f) There are no liars in this cell. Coefficients and standard errors therefore cannot be calculated. 
g) Baseline. 
h) Outcome of the die roll; possible values ranging from 0 to 6 (where  corresponds to ‘0’; , to ‘1’; …; , 
to ‘5’ under truthful reporting). 
i) Possible values ranging from 0 to 15, where 15 is best. 
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Appendix C 
C.1 Instructions and comprehension questions 
 
Instructions for the experiment (Lying condition) 
 
[The instructions were distributed in print. The task was completed on the computer.] 
General instructions 
Welcome to today’s experiment. 
Please keep quiet throughout the experiment and follow the experimenter’s instruc-
tions. Please don’t talk unless asked to talk. 
If you have any questions, raise your hand. The experimenter will come to you and 
answer your questions confidentially. Please turn off your mobile devices and stow them. 
Participants who fail to comply with these instructions will have to leave the room 
and will only be paid €2. 
Task 
Every participant in this room will see a video which shows a six-sided die being rolled. 
Each outcome (, , , , , and ) is equally likely to occur. 
The die is rolled for each participant independently of the others. That is, the die is 
not rolled once for all participants, but for each participant individually. 
You must remember the outcome of your throw and enter it subsequently into a 
field on your computer screen. 
The number that you enter determines your share of €10. This share is your com-
pensation from this experiment. 
Number  
entered 
Your share Remainder 
‘1’ 02 € 08 € 
‘2’ 04 € 06 € 
‘3’ 06 € 04 € 
‘4’ 08 € 02 € 
‘5’ 10 € 00 € 
‘6’ 00 € 10 € 
Payment 
After the experiment, you will answer a number of questions. Your answers can earn you 
additional money. 
You will receive your compensation at the end of the experiment in return for your 
numbered badge. In addition to your compensation from the task, you’ll receive a fixed €4 
payment. 
You will be paid confidentially. Participants will be called out individually to go in-
to the reception room. 
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Instructions for the experiment (Stealing condition) 
 
[The instructions for the Stealing condition are identical to those for the Lying condition 
except for the section ‘Task’ and ‘Payment’ which reads as follows:] 
Task 
Every participant in this room will see a video which shows a six-sided die being rolled. 
Each outcome (, , , , , and ) is equally likely to occur. 
The die is rolled for each participant independently of the others. That is, the die is 
not rolled once for all participants, but for each participant individually. 
You must remember the outcome of your throw and open the envelope in your cab-
in afterwards. 
The number that you remember determines your share of €10. This share is your 
compensation from this experiment. You will find €10 in €2 coins in the envelope. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Please remove your determined share from the envelope and subsequently close the 
envelope. This part of the experiment is then finished. 
The envelope will not be collected immediately and you do not have to submit it at 
the end of the experiment. Please leave the envelope in your cabin. We will collect the en-
velopes once all participants have left the laboratory. 
Payment 
After the experiment, you will answer a number of questions. Your answers can earn you 
additional money. 
You will receive your compensation for the additional tasks at the end of the exper-
iment in return for your numbered badge. In addition to your compensation from the tasks, 
you’ll receive a fixed €4 payment. This payment is independent from the already complet-
ed payment from the die-rolling task. 
You will be paid confidentially. Participants will be called out individually to go in-
to the reception room. 
 
  
Number  
entered 
Your share Remainder 
‘1’ 02 € 08 € 
‘2’ 04 € 06 € 
‘3’ 06 € 04 € 
‘4’ 08 € 02 € 
‘5’ 10 € 00 € 
‘6’ 00 € 10 € 
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Comprehension questions 
 
Participants cannot proceed until they have answered 1 – a, 2 – 6, 3 – 4, and 4 – 8. 
1. What is your task? 
a. To enter the displayed number that you have memorized 
b. To enter a different number than the displayed number that you have memorized 
c. To enter an arbitrary number 
2. Suppose you see a  and you enter a ‘3.’ How many euros do you earn? 
___ 
3. Suppose you see a  and you enter a ‘2.’ How many euros do you earn? 
___ 
4. Suppose you see a  and you enter a ‘4.’ How many euros do you earn? 
___ 
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C.2 Picture of a marked envelope with and without UV light 
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C.3 Protected Value questions 
 
What is your opinion on lying for one’s own benefit? 
I find this … 
Not at all praiseworthy 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 very praiseworthy 
Not at all shameful 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 very shameful 
Not at all acceptable 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 very acceptable 
Not at all outrageous 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 very outrageous 
Not at all blameworthy 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 very blameworthy 
Very immoral 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 very moral 
Honesty is something … 
… that one should not sacrifice, no matter what the (material or other) benefits. 
Strongly disagree 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 strongly agree 
… that cannot be measured in monetary terms. 
Strongly disagree 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 strongly agree 
… for which I think it is right to make a cost–benefit analysis. 
Strongly disagree 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 strongly agree 
… about which I can be flexible if the situation demands it. 
Strongly disagree 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 strongly agree 
… which is about things or values that are sacrosanct. 
Strongly disagree 1–2–3–4–5–6–7 strongly agree 
  
 
 
